Agentic Plugins Marketplace
A community-maintained collection of plugins for Claude Code — Anthropic's AI coding agent. Browse and install MCP servers, skills, hooks, and project templates directly from Claude Code's built-in /plugin TUI.
Table of contents
Official Claude plugin marketplaces
Before adding plugins from community sources, check the official registries — they curate vetted, production-ready integrations:
| Marketplace | What it contains | URL |
|---|
| Anthropic official plugins | Curated integrations (GitHub, Slack, Jira, etc.) maintained by Anthropic | claude.com/plugins |
| MCP Registry | Open registry of MCP servers backed by Anthropic, GitHub, and Microsoft | registry.modelcontextprotocol.io |
Claude Code /plugin built-in | Accessible inside Claude Code via /plugin → Discover tab | run /plugin in Claude Code |
In Claude Code you can add the official marketplace as a source alongside this one:
/plugin
→ Marketplaces tab → Add: claude-plugins-official
Security — prompt injection risk
Warning: only install plugins from sources you trust.
Plugins run with significant privilege inside your Claude session. There are three distinct attack surfaces:
MCP servers — prompt injection via tool responses
When Claude calls a tool, the server's response is injected directly into Claude's context. A malicious server can embed text designed to hijack Claude's subsequent behaviour — for example, instructing it to exfiltrate files, call destructive tools, or ignore safety guidelines. This is particularly dangerous because the injected content arrives as "tool output" rather than user input, making it harder to detect.
Skills — prompt injection via SKILL.md
A skill file from an untrusted source can contain hidden or misleading instructions that override Claude's normal behaviour when the slash command is invoked.
Hooks — arbitrary code execution
Hook scripts (hook.sh) execute as shell commands with the full privileges of your user account. A malicious hook can read credentials, exfiltrate data, or install persistent backdoors — with no sandboxing.
How to protect yourself
- Prefer official marketplaces (see above) for any plugin that touches sensitive systems.
- Read the source before installing. For MCP servers, review the server code or verify it is published by a known maintainer. For skills, read
SKILL.md in full. For hooks, read hook.sh line by line.
- Use the
audit-log hook to record every tool Claude calls — it makes injected behaviour visible after the fact.
- Scope permissions tightly. For MCP servers, use read-only credentials where possible (e.g., a read-only database user for the
postgres plugin).
- Treat unknown marketplaces like unknown npm packages — the blast radius of a compromised plugin is your entire Claude session and anything it has access to.
Plugin types
| Type | What it does |
|---|
| MCP Server | Gives Claude new tools to call external APIs and services |
| Skill | Reusable slash-command prompt that guides Claude through a task |
| Hook | Shell script that runs automatically on Claude lifecycle events |
| Template | Pre-written CLAUDE.md for a specific project type |
Available plugins
MCP Servers
