Skill

defender

Analyzes smart contract repositories for deployment and upgrade safety, classifying projects, auditing CI/CD pipelines, configs, secrets, and signer opsec with evidence-based verdicts.

Git

GitHub Actions

CI/CD

security

devops

npx claudepluginhub quillai-network/quillshield_skills --plugin defender

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This skill uses the workspace's default tool permissions.

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A blue-team release-gate skill for smart contract systems.

Supporting Assets

SKILL.md

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Parent Repo Stars94

Parent Repo Forks13

Last CommitMar 24, 2026

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Defender

A blue-team release-gate skill for smart contract systems.

Defender determines whether a repository is safe to deploy or upgrade. It focuses on release execution risk, not exploit discovery.

Use when

deploying smart contracts
preparing upgrades
reviewing deploy scripts
hardening CI/CD
rotating admin roles
validating ownership handoff
enforcing release hygiene

Non-goals

Defender does NOT replace:

full security audits
economic analysis
invariant discovery
deep proxy vulnerability analysis (proxy-upgrade-safety)

It focuses only on execution safety of release.

Core rule

Evidence first.

Only report findings from:

contracts
deploy scripts
CI workflows
dependency manifests
configs / address books
tests / fork scripts
docs / runbooks

Separate:

Detection → what repo proves
Policy → what should be enforced

Execution order (STRICT)

Project classification
Defence pass
Severity scoring
Release verdict

Reference packs

Always load:

references/finding-catalog.md
references/severity-model.md
references/evidence-query-playbook.md

Load contextually:

classification → project-classification.md
CI → ci-supply-chain.md
deploy drift → config-drift-checks.md
upgrade → upgrade-readiness.md
signer → signer-opsec.md
false confidence → false-confidence.md
post-deploy → post-deploy-validation.md

Templates:

defender-report-template.md
checklist templates as needed

Phase 1 — Project classification

Framework

Detect:

Foundry / Hardhat / hybrid / other

Evidence:

foundry.toml, hardhat.config.*, scripts

Language

Solidity / Vyper / Cairo / mixed

Upgradeability

upgradeable / immutable / mixed

Evidence:

OZ upgrade imports
proxies
initializer usage

Protocol type

Infer:

token / vault / AMM / lending / bridge / governance / NFT / staking / other

Deployment surface

manual / script / CI / multisig / upgrade-task

CI surface

GitHub Actions / GitLab / other / none

Output classification block.

Phase 2 — Defence pass

A. Build integrity

Check:

compiler version pinned
optimizer pinned
evmVersion consistency
lockfiles committed
no conflicting configs (Foundry vs Hardhat)
artifacts reproducible from repo
verification metadata aligned

Escalate if:

build settings differ from verification
configs produce ambiguous outputs

B. Dependencies, secrets, supply chain

Check:

committed secrets
.env usage for private keys
floating versions
unpinned git deps
install scripts
dependency confusion risk
abandoned/suspicious packages
OZ version mismatch
unsafe sidecar tooling
unverified binaries

Secret policy

Plaintext .env private keys are discouraged.

Preferred:

Foundry keystore-backed accounts

Classify:

private key in repo → BLOCKER/HIGH
deploy scripts using plaintext env keys → HIGH
.env for non-sensitive config → acceptable

C. CI/CD trust

Check:

unpinned GitHub Actions
secrets in untrusted workflows
deploys from weak branches
no approval gate
excessive secret access
curl/bash installs
unsafe runners
mixed trust zones

Escalate if CI can deploy unsafely.

D. Deployment config drift

CRITICAL

Check:

chain ID matches target
RPC matches chain
deployer is correct
constructor/initializer args final
addresses (oracle/token/admin) valid for chain
no test/stale addresses
decimals correct
verifier settings pinned
no silent fallback logic

Foundry FFI

default: HIGH
BLOCKER if affecting deploy logic/secrets

E. Deploy-script safety

Check:

chain assertions
deployer assertions
env validation
correct initialization order
idempotency assumptions clear
no test config reuse
address outputs reviewable
no opaque branching
verification steps present

Escalate if scripts can silently misdeploy.

F. Upgrade readiness (if applicable)

Check:

implementation initialized or locked
initializer calldata reviewed
storage diff reviewed
proxy admin correct
multisig/timelock path exists
pause/rollback defined
fork rehearsal exists

G. Signer & admin opsec

Check:

deployer is dedicated
secure signer preferred
admin is multisig
roles separated:
- deployer / upgrader / pauser / treasury
emergency roles documented
no hot wallet admin unless justified
tx review process exists

H. Address & role mapping

Extract:

owner/admin
proxy admin
upgrader
pauser
treasury
oracle
keeper
timelock

Flag:

role concentration
EOA-only control
zero addresses
missing transfer flow

I. Fork rehearsal

Require evidence of:

deploy scripts tested
initializer tested
role transfers tested
upgrade tested
verification tested
smoke tests run

Absence → HIGH (mainnet)

J. Post-deploy readiness

Check defined plan for:

verification
ownership assertions
pause test
oracle checks
event expectations
integration smoke tests
monitoring
deployment manifest

K. Unsafe deploy ergonomics

Check:

one-command broadcast risk
missing confirmations
hidden env defaults
CREATE/CREATE2 assumptions undocumented
nonce-sensitive flows undocumented

Phase 3 — False confidence

MANDATORY

Passing does NOT imply safety:

unit tests
forge test
static analysis
lint
typecheck

Require:

fork rehearsal
permission diff
storage diff
address diff
event checks
role snapshot
post-deploy smoke tests

Phase 4 — Severity

BLOCKER

wrong chain
lost admin
leaked secrets
broken init
broken upgrade
unverifiable deployment

HIGH

unsafe CI
missing rehearsal
FFI misuse
admin EOA risk
stale config

MEDIUM

should fix before mainnet

LOW

hygiene gaps

Specify scope:

mainnet-only / all releases / upgrades only

Phase 5 — Verdict

Always output:

VERDICT: BLOCK DEPLOY
VERDICT: PROCEED WITH RISK
VERDICT: READY FOR STAGED RELEASE

Include:

top blockers
required actions
evidence reviewed

Output format

DEFENDER REPORT

1. Project Classification
- Framework:
- Language:
- Upgradeability:
- Protocol Type:
- Deployment Surface:
- CI Surface:

2. Release Findings

BLOCKER:
- ...

HIGH:
- ...

MEDIUM:
- ...

LOW:
- ...

3. False Confidence Warnings
- ...

4. Release Verdict

VERDICT: ...

Top blockers:
- ...

Required actions:
- ...

Evidence reviewed:
- ...