ark-pentest-issue-resolver

Ark Penetration Test Issue Resolver

Provides detection patterns, mitigation strategies, and fixes for common penetration testing issues found in the Ark platform.

When to use this skill

Use this skill when:

• User reports a penetration testing finding without a specific CVE
• Security audit reveals OWASP Top 10 vulnerabilities
• User mentions issues like "XSS", "SQL injection", "CSRF", etc.
• Need to identify and fix common security misconfigurations

Note: This skill is used by the ark-security-patcher agent when no specific CVE is mentioned. It helps identify and resolve standard penetration testing findings.

Common Penetration Test Issues

1. SQL Injection

Description: Attacker can inject malicious SQL queries through user input.

Detection Patterns:

# VULNERABLE: Direct string concatenation
query = f"SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = '{username}'"

# VULNERABLE: String formatting
query = "SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = %s" % user_id

Mitigation:

# SECURE: Use parameterized queries
cursor.execute("SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = ?", (username,))

# SECURE: Use ORM with parameter binding
User.objects.filter(username=username)

# SECURE: Use sqlalchemy with bound parameters
session.query(User).filter(User.username == username)

Ark Context:

• Check Python services: services/ark-api/, executor services
• Search for: cursor.execute, db.query, SQL string concatenation
• Verify all database queries use parameterized statements

---

2. Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

Description: Attacker can inject malicious JavaScript into web pages viewed by other users.

Types:

• Reflected XSS: Malicious script in URL/request is reflected in response
• Stored XSS: Malicious script stored in database and displayed to users
• DOM-based XSS: Vulnerability exists in client-side JavaScript

Detection Patterns:

// VULNERABLE: Direct innerHTML manipulation
element.innerHTML = userInput;

// VULNERABLE: Unescaped template rendering
return `<div>${userInput}</div>`;

// VULNERABLE: dangerouslySetInnerHTML in React
<div dangerouslySetInnerHTML={{__html: userInput}} />

Mitigation:

// SECURE: Use textContent
element.textContent = userInput;

// SECURE: Use React/Vue built-in escaping
return <div>{userInput}</div>

// SECURE: Sanitize HTML if HTML input is required
import DOMPurify from 'dompurify';
const clean = DOMPurify.sanitize(userInput);

// SECURE: Set Content-Security-Policy header
Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'

Ark Context:

• Check: ark-dashboard/, docs/ (Next.js applications)
• Search for: dangerouslySetInnerHTML, innerHTML, unescaped templates
• Ensure proper Content-Security-Policy headers in Next.js config
• Verify all user input is escaped in React components

---

3. Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)

Description: Attacker tricks user into executing unwanted actions on authenticated application.

Detection Patterns:

// VULNERABLE: No CSRF token validation
http.HandleFunc("/api/delete", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
    // Directly processes DELETE without token
    deleteUser(r.FormValue("id"))
})

Mitigation:

// SECURE: Use CSRF middleware
import "github.com/gorilla/csrf"

csrfMiddleware := csrf.Protect(
    []byte("32-byte-long-auth-key"),
    csrf.Secure(true),
)
http.ListenAndServe(":8000", csrfMiddleware(router))

// SECURE: Verify CSRF token
token := r.Header.Get("X-CSRF-Token")
if !csrf.Validate(token, session) {
    http.Error(w, "Invalid CSRF token", http.StatusForbidden)
    return
}

// SECURE: Use SameSite cookie attribute
http.SetCookie(w, &http.Cookie{
    Name:     "session",
    Value:    sessionID,
    SameSite: http.SameSiteStrictMode,
    Secure:   true,
    HttpOnly: true,
})

Ark Context:

• Check: Go operator API endpoints, Python API services
• Search for: State-changing endpoints (POST, PUT, DELETE) without CSRF protection
• Verify cookies use SameSite=Strict or SameSite=Lax
• Add CSRF middleware to API routes that modify state

---

4. Insecure Direct Object References (IDOR)

Description: Application exposes internal implementation objects (IDs) without proper authorization checks.

Detection Patterns:

# VULNERABLE: No authorization check
@app.route('/api/user/<user_id>')
def get_user(user_id):
    return User.query.get(user_id)  # Any authenticated user can access any user

# VULNERABLE: Predictable IDs
@app.route('/api/document/<int:doc_id>')
def get_document(doc_id):
    return Document.query.get(doc_id)  # Sequential IDs are guessable

Mitigation:

# SECURE: Check authorization
@app.route('/api/user/<user_id>')
def get_user(user_id):
    user = User.query.get(user_id)
    if user.id != current_user.id and not current_user.is_admin:
        abort(403, "Unauthorized")
    return user

# SECURE: Use UUIDs instead of sequential IDs
import uuid
user_id = uuid.uuid4()

# SECURE: Implement resource ownership check
def check_ownership(resource_id, user_id):
    resource = Resource.query.get(resource_id)
    if resource.owner_id != user_id:
        raise PermissionDenied()

Ark Context:

• Check: All REST API endpoints in Python services, Go operator
• Search for: Direct ID references in URL paths, missing authorization checks
• Verify: Every resource access checks user permissions
• Consider: Using UUIDs for resource identifiers

---

5. Security Misconfiguration

Description: Insecure default configurations, incomplete setups, open cloud storage, misconfigured HTTP headers.

Common Issues:

Missing Security Headers

Detection:

curl -I https://ark-dashboard.example.com | grep -E "X-Frame-Options|X-Content-Type-Options|Strict-Transport-Security"

Mitigation:

// Add security headers middleware
func securityHeaders(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
    return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
        w.Header().Set("X-Frame-Options", "DENY")
        w.Header().Set("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff")
        w.Header().Set("X-XSS-Protection", "1; mode=block")
        w.Header().Set("Strict-Transport-Security", "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains")
        w.Header().Set("Content-Security-Policy", "default-src 'self'")
        w.Header().Set("Referrer-Policy", "strict-origin-when-cross-origin")
        next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
    })
}

// Next.js configuration (next.config.js)
module.exports = {
  async headers() {
    return [
      {
        source: '/:path*',
        headers: [
          { key: 'X-Frame-Options', value: 'DENY' },
          { key: 'X-Content-Type-Options', value: 'nosniff' },
          { key: 'X-XSS-Protection', value: '1; mode=block' },
          { key: 'Strict-Transport-Security', value: 'max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains' },
          { key: 'Referrer-Policy', value: 'strict-origin-when-cross-origin' },
        ],
      },
    ]
  },
}

Debug Mode Enabled in Production

Detection:

grep -r "DEBUG.*=.*true" .
grep -r "NODE_ENV.*development" .

Mitigation:

• Set DEBUG=false in production
• Set NODE_ENV=production
• Remove stack traces from error responses
• Disable verbose logging in production

---

6. Sensitive Data Exposure

Description: Application exposes sensitive data through logs, error messages, or insecure transmission.

Detection Patterns:

# VULNERABLE: Logging sensitive data
logger.info(f"User {username} logged in with password {password}")

# VULNERABLE: Exposing secrets in error messages
raise Exception(f"Database connection failed: {db_password}")

# VULNERABLE: Sensitive data in URLs
redirect(f"/reset-password?token={reset_token}")

Mitigation:

# SECURE: Never log sensitive data
logger.info(f"User {username} logged in successfully")

# SECURE: Generic error messages
raise Exception("Database connection failed")
logger.error("DB error", exc_info=True)  # Full details only in logs

# SECURE: Use POST for sensitive data
# POST /reset-password with token in body

# SECURE: Mask sensitive data
def mask_credit_card(card_number):
    return f"****-****-****-{card_number[-4:]}"

Environment Variables:

# VULNERABLE: Hardcoded secrets
API_KEY = "sk_live_abc123xyz"

# SECURE: Use environment variables
API_KEY = os.getenv("API_KEY")

# SECURE: Use Kubernetes secrets
apiVersion: v1
kind: Secret
metadata:
  name: ark-secrets
type: Opaque
data:
  api-key: <base64-encoded-value>

Ark Context:

• Check: All logging statements, error handlers
• Search for: Hardcoded secrets, API keys, passwords
• Verify: TLS/HTTPS for all communications
• Use: Kubernetes Secrets for sensitive configuration

---

7. Broken Authentication

Description: Weak authentication mechanisms allowing credential stuffing, brute force, or session hijacking.

Common Issues:

Weak Password Requirements

Mitigation:

import re

def validate_password(password):
    """Enforce strong password policy"""
    if len(password) < 12:
        return False, "Password must be at least 12 characters"
    if not re.search(r"[A-Z]", password):
        return False, "Password must contain uppercase letter"
    if not re.search(r"[a-z]", password):
        return False, "Password must contain lowercase letter"
    if not re.search(r"[0-9]", password):
        return False, "Password must contain number"
    if not re.search(r"[!@#$%^&*]", password):
        return False, "Password must contain special character"
    return True, "Password is valid"

No Rate Limiting on Login

Mitigation:

import "golang.org/x/time/rate"

// Rate limiter: 5 requests per minute per IP
var limiter = rate.NewLimiter(rate.Every(time.Minute/5), 5)

func loginHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
    if !limiter.Allow() {
        http.Error(w, "Too many requests", http.StatusTooManyRequests)
        return
    }
    // Process login
}

Insecure Session Management

Mitigation:

// SECURE: Generate cryptographically secure session IDs
import "crypto/rand"

func generateSessionID() (string, error) {
    b := make([]byte, 32)
    if _, err := rand.Read(b); err != nil {
        return "", err
    }
    return base64.URLEncoding.EncodeToString(b), nil
}

// SECURE: Set secure cookie attributes
http.SetCookie(w, &http.Cookie{
    Name:     "session_id",
    Value:    sessionID,
    Path:     "/",
    MaxAge:   3600,
    HttpOnly: true,  // Prevent JavaScript access
    Secure:   true,  // Only send over HTTPS
    SameSite: http.SameSiteStrictMode,
})

---

8. Broken Access Control

Description: Users can act outside their intended permissions.

Detection Patterns:

# VULNERABLE: No permission check
@app.route('/api/admin/users', methods=['DELETE'])
def delete_user():
    user_id = request.json['user_id']
    User.query.filter_by(id=user_id).delete()

Mitigation:

# SECURE: Role-based access control (RBAC)
from functools import wraps

def require_role(*roles):
    def decorator(f):
        @wraps(f)
        def decorated_function(*args, **kwargs):
            if not current_user.is_authenticated:
                abort(401)
            if current_user.role not in roles:
                abort(403, "Insufficient permissions")
            return f(*args, **kwargs)
        return decorated_function
    return decorator

@app.route('/api/admin/users', methods=['DELETE'])
@require_role('admin', 'superuser')
def delete_user():
    user_id = request.json['user_id']
    User.query.filter_by(id=user_id).delete()

Kubernetes RBAC (for Ark operator):

apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: Role
metadata:
  name: ark-operator
rules:
- apiGroups: ["ark.example.com"]
  resources: ["models", "prompts"]
  verbs: ["get", "list", "watch", "create", "update", "patch", "delete"]

Ark Context:

• Check: All API endpoints for authorization checks
• Verify: Kubernetes RBAC rules are properly scoped
• Implement: Principle of least privilege
• Test: Horizontal privilege escalation (user A accessing user B's resources)

---

9. Insufficient Logging & Monitoring

Description: Lack of logging and monitoring allows attacks to go undetected.

Mitigation:

import logging
import structlog

# Configure structured logging
logger = structlog.get_logger()

# Log security events
def log_security_event(event_type, user_id, details):
    logger.info(
        "security_event",
        event_type=event_type,
        user_id=user_id,
        details=details,
        timestamp=datetime.utcnow().isoformat()
    )

# Examples of what to log
log_security_event("login_success", user.id, {"ip": request.remote_addr})
log_security_event("login_failure", username, {"ip": request.remote_addr})
log_security_event("password_change", user.id, {})
log_security_event("permission_denied", user.id, {"resource": resource_id})
log_security_event("admin_action", user.id, {"action": "delete_user", "target": target_id})

Events to Log:

• Authentication successes and failures
• Authorization failures
• Input validation failures
• Administrative actions
• Resource access (especially sensitive resources)
• Data modifications
• Security configuration changes

---

10. Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

Description: Attacker tricks server into making requests to internal resources.

Detection Patterns:

# VULNERABLE: Direct use of user-provided URL
import requests
url = request.args.get('url')
response = requests.get(url)  # Can access internal resources!

Mitigation:

# SECURE: Validate and whitelist URLs
import ipaddress
from urllib.parse import urlparse

ALLOWED_DOMAINS = ['api.example.com', 'cdn.example.com']

def is_safe_url(url):
    try:
        parsed = urlparse(url)

        # Only allow HTTP/HTTPS
        if parsed.scheme not in ['http', 'https']:
            return False

        # Check against whitelist
        if parsed.hostname not in ALLOWED_DOMAINS:
            return False

        # Resolve hostname and check it's not internal
        ip = socket.gethostbyname(parsed.hostname)
        if ipaddress.ip_address(ip).is_private:
            return False

        return True
    except Exception:
        return False

# Use the validator
url = request.args.get('url')
if not is_safe_url(url):
    abort(400, "Invalid URL")
response = requests.get(url)

Ark Context:

• Check: Any API that fetches URLs from user input
• Search for: requests.get, http.Get, fetch with user-provided URLs
• Implement: URL whitelist for external API calls

---

11. XML External Entities (XXE)

Description: Attacker can include external entities in XML to read files or cause DoS.

Detection Patterns:

# VULNERABLE: Unsafe XML parsing
import xml.etree.ElementTree as ET
tree = ET.parse(xml_file)  # Vulnerable to XXE

Mitigation:

# SECURE: Disable external entity processing
import defusedxml.ElementTree as ET
tree = ET.parse(xml_file)  # Safe from XXE

# SECURE: Configure parser to disable DTDs
from lxml import etree
parser = etree.XMLParser(resolve_entities=False, no_network=True, dtd_validation=False)
tree = etree.parse(xml_file, parser)

---

12. Insecure Deserialization

Description: Untrusted data is deserialized, potentially allowing remote code execution.

Detection Patterns:

# VULNERABLE: Pickle deserialization of untrusted data
import pickle
data = pickle.loads(untrusted_data)  # Can execute arbitrary code!

# VULNERABLE: YAML unsafe loading
import yaml
data = yaml.load(untrusted_yaml)  # Can execute Python code

Mitigation:

# SECURE: Use JSON instead of pickle
import json
data = json.loads(untrusted_data)

# SECURE: Use safe YAML loading
import yaml
data = yaml.safe_load(untrusted_yaml)

# SECURE: If pickle is necessary, use HMAC verification
import hmac
import hashlib

def serialize_with_hmac(obj, secret_key):
    serialized = pickle.dumps(obj)
    signature = hmac.new(secret_key, serialized, hashlib.sha256).digest()
    return signature + serialized

def deserialize_with_hmac(data, secret_key):
    signature = data[:32]
    serialized = data[32:]
    expected_signature = hmac.new(secret_key, serialized, hashlib.sha256).digest()
    if not hmac.compare_digest(signature, expected_signature):
        raise ValueError("Invalid signature")
    return pickle.loads(serialized)

---

13. Path Traversal

Description: Attacker accesses files outside intended directory using ../ sequences.

Detection Patterns:

# VULNERABLE: Direct file path from user input
filename = request.args.get('file')
with open(f'/var/www/uploads/{filename}', 'r') as f:  # Can access ../../../../etc/passwd
    content = f.read()

Mitigation:

# SECURE: Validate and sanitize file paths
import os
from pathlib import Path

UPLOAD_DIR = '/var/www/uploads'

def safe_file_path(filename):
    # Remove any directory components
    filename = os.path.basename(filename)

    # Build full path
    full_path = os.path.join(UPLOAD_DIR, filename)

    # Resolve to absolute path and verify it's within UPLOAD_DIR
    full_path = os.path.abspath(full_path)
    if not full_path.startswith(os.path.abspath(UPLOAD_DIR)):
        raise ValueError("Invalid file path")

    return full_path

# Use the validator
filename = request.args.get('file')
safe_path = safe_file_path(filename)
with open(safe_path, 'r') as f:
    content = f.read()

---

14. Command Injection

Description: Attacker can execute arbitrary system commands.

Detection Patterns:

# VULNERABLE: Direct command execution with user input
import os
filename = request.args.get('file')
os.system(f'ls -l {filename}')  # Can inject: file.txt; rm -rf /

# VULNERABLE: Shell=True with user input
import subprocess
subprocess.call(f'ping {host}', shell=True)

Mitigation:

# SECURE: Use subprocess with list of arguments (no shell)
import subprocess
filename = request.args.get('file')
subprocess.run(['ls', '-l', filename], check=True, capture_output=True)

# SECURE: Validate and sanitize input
import shlex
def safe_command(user_input):
    # Whitelist allowed characters
    if not re.match(r'^[a-zA-Z0-9._-]+$', user_input):
        raise ValueError("Invalid input")
    return user_input

# SECURE: Use libraries instead of shell commands
# Instead of: os.system('tar -czf archive.tar.gz files/')
import tarfile
with tarfile.open('archive.tar.gz', 'w:gz') as tar:
    tar.add('files/')

Ark Context:

• Check: Any code executing shell commands (especially in executors)
• Search for: os.system, subprocess.call, shell=True
• Verify: All external commands use argument lists, not shell strings

---

15. Missing Rate Limiting

Description: No protection against brute force, DoS, or resource exhaustion attacks.

Mitigation:

# Python with Flask-Limiter
from flask_limiter import Limiter
from flask_limiter.util import get_remote_address

limiter = Limiter(
    app,
    key_func=get_remote_address,
    default_limits=["200 per day", "50 per hour"]
)

@app.route("/api/login", methods=["POST"])
@limiter.limit("5 per minute")
def login():
    # Login logic
    pass

// Go with rate limiting middleware
import "golang.org/x/time/rate"

func rateLimitMiddleware(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
    limiter := rate.NewLimiter(rate.Every(time.Second), 10) // 10 req/sec

    return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
        if !limiter.Allow() {
            http.Error(w, "Rate limit exceeded", http.StatusTooManyRequests)
            return
        }
        next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
    })
}

Kubernetes Network Policies:

apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
  name: rate-limit-policy
spec:
  podSelector:
    matchLabels:
      app: ark-api
  policyTypes:
  - Ingress
  ingress:
  - from:
    - podSelector:
        matchLabels:
          app: ingress-controller

---

Workflow: Resolving Pentest Issues

Step 1: Identify the Issue Category

Map the reported issue to one of the categories above:

• SQL Injection → Database queries
• XSS → User input rendering
• CSRF → State-changing API endpoints
• IDOR → Resource access without authorization
• Security Misconfiguration → Headers, debug mode, defaults
• Sensitive Data Exposure → Logging, error messages, transmission
• Broken Authentication → Password policy, session management
• Broken Access Control → Permission checks, RBAC
• Insufficient Logging → Security event logging
• SSRF → External URL fetching
• XXE → XML parsing
• Insecure Deserialization → Pickle, YAML loading
• Path Traversal → File system access
• Command Injection → System command execution
• Missing Rate Limiting → API protection

Step 2: Search for Vulnerable Patterns

Use grep/ripgrep to find vulnerable code patterns:

# SQL Injection
grep -r "cursor.execute.*%" .
grep -r "query.*format" .

# XSS
grep -r "innerHTML" .
grep -r "dangerouslySetInnerHTML" .

# Command Injection
grep -r "os.system" .
grep -r "shell=True" .

# Path Traversal
grep -r "open.*request" .

# Insecure Deserialization
grep -r "pickle.loads" .
grep -r "yaml.load" .

Step 3: Analyze Impact on Ark

Consider which Ark components are affected:

• Go Operator: ark/ - Controllers, webhooks, API server
• Python Services: services/ - Executor services, API endpoints
• Node.js Applications: ark-dashboard/, docs/, ark-cli/
• Kubernetes Resources: Deployment configs, RBAC, Network Policies

Step 4: Present Mitigation Options

Present the user with:

1. Vulnerable code patterns found
2. Recommended fixes for each pattern
3. Testing strategy
4. Potential breaking changes

Wait for user approval before implementing.

Step 5: Implement Fixes

Apply the appropriate mitigation from the categories above:

• Update vulnerable code patterns
• Add security middleware/validators
• Configure security headers
• Update dependencies if needed

Step 6: Test the Fixes

# Run existing tests
make test

# Security-specific tests
# - Test with malicious input
# - Verify security headers
# - Check authorization enforcement
# - Validate input sanitization

Step 7: Create PR with Security Context

Document:

• What vulnerability was found
• Where it was found (files, line numbers)
• What was changed to fix it
• How to verify the fix
• Any breaking changes

---

Ark-Specific Security Considerations

Kubernetes Operator Security

CRD Validation:

// Add validation to CRD specs
// +kubebuilder:validation:Pattern=^[a-zA-Z0-9-]+$
// +kubebuilder:validation:MinLength=1
// +kubebuilder:validation:MaxLength=253
Name string `json:"name"`

RBAC Principle of Least Privilege:

# Only grant necessary permissions
rules:
- apiGroups: ["ark.example.com"]
  resources: ["models"]
  verbs: ["get", "list"]  # Not "delete" or "*"

Python Service Security

Input Validation:

from pydantic import BaseModel, validator

class PromptRequest(BaseModel):
    prompt: str
    max_tokens: int

    @validator('prompt')
    def validate_prompt(cls, v):
        if len(v) > 10000:
            raise ValueError('Prompt too long')
        return v

    @validator('max_tokens')
    def validate_max_tokens(cls, v):
        if v < 1 or v > 4096:
            raise ValueError('Invalid max_tokens')
        return v

Node.js / Next.js Security

Environment Variables:

// Only expose NEXT_PUBLIC_ vars to client
// next.config.js
module.exports = {
  env: {
    // Server-side only
    DATABASE_URL: process.env.DATABASE_URL,
  },
  publicRuntimeConfig: {
    // Client-side accessible
    API_URL: process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_API_URL,
  },
}

Docker Security

Non-root User:

# Run as non-root user
RUN addgroup -g 1001 -S appuser && \
    adduser -u 1001 -S appuser -G appuser
USER appuser

Minimal Base Images:

# Use distroless or alpine
FROM gcr.io/distroless/python3
# OR
FROM python:3.11-alpine

---

Testing Security Fixes

Manual Testing Checklist

• Test with malicious input (SQL injection payloads)
• Test with XSS payloads (<script>alert('XSS')</script>)
• Test with path traversal (../../../../etc/passwd)
• Test authorization bypasses (user A accessing user B's data)
• Test rate limiting (excessive requests)
• Verify security headers present
• Check error messages don't expose sensitive data
• Verify HTTPS/TLS is enforced

Automated Security Testing

# Static analysis
bandit -r services/  # Python
gosec ./...          # Go
npm audit            # Node.js

# Dependency scanning
safety check         # Python
go list -json -m all | nancy sleuth  # Go
npm audit fix        # Node.js

# Container scanning
trivy image ark-operator:latest

---

Common Penetration Test Report Keywords

When you see these terms in a pentest report, map them to the appropriate category:

• "Insufficient input validation" → SQL Injection, XSS, Command Injection, Path Traversal
• "Missing security headers" → Security Misconfiguration (#5)
• "Sensitive information disclosure" → Sensitive Data Exposure (#6)
• "Missing CSRF protection" → CSRF (#3)
• "Broken access control" → IDOR (#4) or Broken Access Control (#8)
• "Weak authentication" → Broken Authentication (#7)
• "Insecure session management" → Broken Authentication (#7)
• "Server-side request forgery" → SSRF (#10)
• "XML external entity injection" → XXE (#11)
• "Insecure deserialization" → Insecure Deserialization (#12)
• "Directory traversal" → Path Traversal (#13)
• "OS command injection" → Command Injection (#14)
• "No rate limiting" → Missing Rate Limiting (#15)
• "Information leakage" → Sensitive Data Exposure (#6)
• "Insufficient logging" → Insufficient Logging & Monitoring (#9)

---

Important Notes

• Always get user approval before implementing security fixes
• Test thoroughly - security fixes can break functionality
• Document the vulnerability clearly in commit messages and PRs
• Consider backward compatibility when changing APIs or behaviors
• Prioritize by severity: Critical > High > Medium > Low
• Defense in depth: Apply multiple layers of security controls
• Principle of least privilege: Grant minimum necessary permissions

Resources

• OWASP Top 10
• OWASP Cheat Sheet Series
• CWE Top 25
• Kubernetes Security Best Practices