guild-quality

guild:quality

Realizes DI-2 (full Quality skill) (decisions/di1-di6-contracts.md) against the frozen guild.quality.v1 (./quality-contract.md §"guild.quality.v1 fields"; predicate ./quality-contract.md §"ReleaseGate predicate"). Flow: SignalScan → SelectMatrix → RunChecks → G-quality → ReleaseGate. Lean playbook here; mechanics, full pass_when, and the ReleaseGate truth-table in ./quality-mechanics.md (open per step — behaviour identical).

When to use it

At the quality phase: derive the check matrix from on-disk signals, run discovered harnesses under sandbox + canonical budget, collect the advisory G-quality trail, and compute (never ask) a release recommendation over the full disposition enum.

When not to use it

• Operations / runbooks (release, monitoring, incident, rollback, maintenance) → guild:operations.
• Authoring/installing a test harness → qa-* specialists; this skill runs only discovered harnesses, never authors or installs.
• Initiative closure (D8 close-gate) → InitiativeCloseout; this skill only supplies the quality evidence Operations reads.

Required inputs

• A passing .guild/runs/<run-id>/verify.md (the build phase's guild:verify-done output). Quality runs after a passing verify-done, never instead (invariant 4, ./quality-contract.md §"Lifecycle ordering"): absent or failing ⇒ route-back to Development — do not proceed silently. An explicit operator decision to proceed without it MUST be recorded (name + reason) in the quality report.
• task_run permission envelope + the immutable always-ask hard set (./quality-contract.md §"task_run envelope & always-ask hard set", which cites scripts/lib/permission-policy-schema.ts).
• Canonical budget defaults.quality.budget by pointer to ./quality-contract.md §Budget (numbers never restated).
• Signal rules ./quality-contract.md §selection; frozen guild.quality.v1 (./quality-contract.md §"guild.quality.v1 fields", pointer only).

Output format

guild.quality.v1 at .guild/runs/<run-id>/quality/<run-id>.md — selection / results / challenger_trail / release_decision blocks by pointer to ./quality-contract.md §selection / §results / §challenger_trail / §release_decision (zero re-spelled fields).

Workflow steps

Full mechanics + pass_when per step: ./quality-mechanics.md.

selection

SignalScan → SelectMatrix: deterministic, surfaced, overridable. Each class in {e2e, smoke, a11y, perf, integration} decided from a deterministic on-disk signal (no LLM guess); none silently skipped — each is selected / not_applicable: <reason> / gap: …no harness found. Surface matrix + budget + [proceed] [edit-selection] [explain-signals] (no --classes= flag); edit-selection records override: user. Populate selection → ./quality-contract.md §selection.

runchecks

Run only discovered harnesses (never author/install — qa-* own that) under the task_run envelope + the unconditional always-ask hard set. Budget = defaults.quality.budget by pointer to ./quality-contract.md §Budget (numbers never restated); exhaustion ⇒ inconclusive: budget exhausted, never a silent pass. Populate results → ./quality-contract.md §results.

g-quality

Two distinct, both-kept review mechanisms at this boundary (https://guildstack.dev/docs/adversarial-review):

1. In-phase advisory panel. Advisory (non-blocking). Sourced from the station composer's qa advisory_panel (SoT: src/modules/teams/workflows/station-composer.ts STATION_POLICY.qa.advisory_panel) — not a hardcoded fixed pair: producer qa-test-strategy (matches the composer); challengers security (BASELINE — always present) + architect (GATED on multi_component, recorded chal:qa:architect); cross-model-preferred (flag recorded). Findings resolve by rerun / added check / named owner-accepted risk — never itself blocks. Populate challenger_trail → ./quality-contract.md §challenger_trail.

2. Cross-host G-quality gate via the broker (policy-gated). Separate from the same-session panel above: this is the cross-host review where a different host family critiques the quality report. After the report is written and before releasegate computes, invoke guild-review-broker:

   Skill: guild-review-broker
   args: gate=G-quality artifact_path=<quality-report-path> run_id=<run-id> author_host=<run author host>
   

   The broker is policy-gated (https://guildstack.dev/docs/adversarial-review): it fires only when risk ≥ high, review: cross / --review=cross, or config requires it — else it resolves status: "skipped" and the boundary passes with no cross-host reviewer (self-build runs treat it as always-on). On "rework", resolve the findings before releasegate. The broker gate is the cross-host layer; it does not replace the advisory panel and does not alter the releasegate BLOCK semantics below.

releasegate

COMPUTED (never asked), complete over {pass | fail | inconclusive | not_applicable | gap}, CITED by pointer to ./quality-contract.md §"ReleaseGate predicate" (the canonical predicate) — never re-derived/"extended" (GR-5). BLOCK iff any selected class is fail, OR inconclusive with no owner-accepted risk, OR a security/privacy/reliability-relevant gap with no owner-accepted risk; else RELEASE-READY. not_applicable and a non-safety gap never block (surfaced in the gate summary, release-ready by default). Gate [release] [block] [abort]; [release] on a BLOCK is a HUMAN-ONLY force-pass (name + rationale recorded). --auto-approve tokens [spec, plan, build, qa, all] — no ops: qa (and all) auto-passes a RELEASE-READY verdict ONLY; a BLOCK→release override is NEVER auto-passed under any token (asymmetry printed, never silent). Populate release_decision → ./quality-contract.md §release_decision. Full truth-table: quality-mechanics.md.

learning-checkpoint (step 7.5 — advisory, no new gate)

After releasegate and before phase close, fire the per-phase LearningCheckpoint with phase=quality and the quality report as evidence_ref. Invoke guild:learning-checkpoint to classify the already-written quality report (results, challenger trail, release decision) into the 12-target verdict, then emit via the hook — full call signature + GUILD_PHASE mapping canonical in skills/meta/learning-checkpoint/SKILL.md §"How a phase skill fires the checkpoint" (do not re-spell). It rides this existing boundary, defaults to all-none (a near-zero-token no-op), asks no new prompt, and adds no new gate; it does NOT touch the releasegate BLOCK semantics. Non-none verdicts route only to .guild/reflections/<run-id>.md.

Evidence requirements

• selection: deterministic-signal table + 3-choice prompt; grep proves zero copied schema. runchecks: budget a §4.4 pointer (no literals); discovered-harness-only. g-quality: composer-derived qa advisory_panel + cross-model flag + advisory (non-blocking). releasegate: pointer-cited truth-table (quality-mechanics.md) + zero-drift diff vs ./quality-contract.md §"ReleaseGate predicate" + the printed BLOCK-override asymmetry.

Escalation rules

• A BLOCK is never overridden by automation: [release] on a BLOCK escalates to a human (name + rationale); the --auto-approve=qa token is PASS-only — it never touches a BLOCK.
• G-quality findings escalate to the named owner (rerun / added check / owner-accepted risk) — G-quality itself never blocks.

Safety constraints

• Always-ask hard set is unconditional — network/destructive prompts fire inline regardless of --auto-approve (by pointer, not re-spelled).
• Release predicate is single-source (./quality-contract.md §"ReleaseGate predicate"); cited, never extended/restated (GR-5). No frozen guild.quality.v1 field text reproduced — all by pointer through ./quality-contract.md §"guild.quality.v1 fields".

Eval cases

1. All-pass, no defaults config → RELEASE-READY; auto-passes under --auto-approve=all.
2. One selected class fail → BLOCK; [release] needs a named human force-pass; not auto-passed under --auto-approve=all.
3. inconclusive, no owner → BLOCK; with a named owner-accepted risk → not a block by that row.
4. Budget exhausted → inconclusive: budget exhausted (never silent pass).
5. not_applicable → never blocks (informational only — on any class, selected or not).
6. Class applicable, no harness → gap; if security/privacy/reliability- relevant and no owner-accepted risk → BLOCK; a non-safety gap never blocks (surfaced, release-ready by default).