From harness-claude
Identifies security flaws in design documents and architectures early to avoid costly fixes. Guides threat modeling, security requirements elicitation, and design reviews for sensitive data features.
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> Find security flaws in the design document, not in the penetration test report -- because
Provides OWASP security design principles, STRIDE threat modeling, and architectural mitigations. Use when designing systems or reviewing architecture for security.
Conducts threat modeling using STRIDE, PASTA, attack trees; performs security architecture reviews, risk assessments, and extracts security requirements for secure-by-design systems.
Performs threat modeling with STRIDE, PASTA, attack trees; reviews security architecture, extracts requirements, prioritizes risks, designs mitigations for secure-by-design systems.
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Find security flaws in the design document, not in the penetration test report -- because fixing an architecture flaw costs 100x more after deployment than during design
The NIST/IBM Systems Sciences Institute data on defect cost escalation shows that a security flaw found in the design phase costs 1x to fix, in implementation costs 6.5x, in testing costs 15x, and in production costs 100x. These numbers are not theoretical -- they reflect the difference between changing a design document and performing an emergency production deployment with data breach notification, incident response, customer communication, and regulatory reporting.
The 2017 Equifax breach (CVE-2017-5638, Apache Struts) exposed 147 million records. The vulnerability was in a third-party component, but the architectural failure was deeper: the application ran with direct access to a database containing 147 million unencrypted SSNs, with no network segmentation, no data access monitoring, and no principle of least privilege. These are design-phase decisions. A threat model during design would have identified that a single web application vulnerability should not grant access to the entire consumer database.
Organizations that defer security analysis to the testing phase consistently find architectural flaws that cannot be fixed without redesigning the system. At that point, the choice is between shipping an insecure architecture or missing the deadline by months. Shift-left security ensures that security-critical design decisions are made when they are cheapest and easiest to change.
Elicit security requirements alongside functional requirements. For every user story or feature specification, ask: What data does this feature access, store, or transmit? Who is authorized to use this feature? What happens if this feature is abused? What compliance requirements apply? Security requirements are not separate from functional requirements -- they are constraints on how functionality is implemented. Document them in the same backlog and give them the same priority as functional requirements.
Conduct a threat model for every new feature that changes the trust boundary. Not every feature needs a full STRIDE analysis, but any feature that introduces a new data flow, a new external integration, a new user role, or a new API endpoint should have a lightweight threat model. Use the "four question" approach: What are we building? What can go wrong? What are we going to do about it? Did we do a good job? This takes 30-60 minutes in a design review meeting and identifies architectural vulnerabilities that no scanner will find.
Integrate security checkpoints into agile ceremonies. Sprint planning: review new stories for security implications. Design review: include a "security considerations" section in every design document. Definition of done: include "threat model reviewed" and "security requirements addressed" alongside "tests pass" and "code reviewed." Retrospective: review security findings from the sprint and adjust processes. These are lightweight additions to existing ceremonies, not new meetings.
Create and maintain a security design review checklist. The checklist should cover: authentication (how does the feature verify user identity?), authorization (who can perform which actions on which resources?), input validation (what inputs does the feature accept and how are they validated?), data protection (is sensitive data encrypted at rest and in transit?), logging (what security-relevant events does this feature produce?), error handling (do error messages leak internal details?), and dependency risk (what new dependencies does this feature introduce?). The checklist is a starting point, not a substitute for thinking.
Use abuse cases alongside use cases. For every use case ("User uploads a profile photo"), write the corresponding abuse case ("Attacker uploads a PHP webshell as a profile photo," "Attacker uploads a 10GB file to exhaust storage," "Attacker uploads an image with EXIF GPS data harvesting"). Abuse cases force the team to think adversarially during design, not after deployment. They also produce concrete test cases for the QA team.
Establish architecture-level security patterns as defaults. Reduce the design-phase security burden by establishing organizational defaults: all inter-service communication uses mTLS, all data stores encrypt at rest, all APIs require authentication, all user input is validated against a schema, all sensitive operations produce audit events. When these are defaults, the design review focuses on feature-specific risks rather than relitigating baseline security decisions.
Track security design decisions as architectural decision records (ADRs). When a design review produces a security-relevant decision (using JWT instead of session cookies, choosing row-level security over application-level filtering, accepting a specific risk with mitigation), record it as an ADR. This creates a searchable history of why security decisions were made, prevents relitigating resolved decisions, and provides context for future threat model updates.
The cost curve of defect remediation: IBM Systems Sciences Institute and NIST data show exponential cost increases as defects move through the SDLC. Design phase: 1x (change the document). Implementation phase: 6.5x (rewrite code, update tests). Testing phase: 15x (fix code, retest, delay release). Production phase: 100x (emergency patch, incident response, customer notification, regulatory reporting, reputation damage). The Ponemon Institute's Cost of a Data Breach Report (2023) puts the average cost of a data breach at $4.45 million, with breaches caused by security system complexity and cloud migration failures (both design-phase issues) costing significantly more.
Security requirements elicitation techniques: OWASP Application Security Verification Standard (ASVS) provides a comprehensive checklist of security requirements organized by level (L1: opportunistic, L2: standard, L3: advanced). Use ASVS as a requirements source during design. Microsoft's Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) provides security requirements templates. NIST SP 800-53 provides security control families for federal systems. Map compliance requirements (SOC2, PCI-DSS, HIPAA) to specific security requirements early.
Lightweight threat modeling for agile teams: The full STRIDE-per-element analysis is too heavyweight for every sprint. Use rapid threat modeling: 15-minute session during design review, focused on the specific feature being built. Draw the data flow diagram for the new feature on a whiteboard, identify trust boundaries, and brainstorm threats at each boundary crossing. Document findings as backlog items. This scales to agile velocity.
Security design review triggers: Not every code change needs a security review. Define triggers: new authentication or authorization logic, new data stores for sensitive data, new external integrations or API endpoints, changes to encryption or key management, new user roles or permission models, infrastructure changes (new services, network changes). Changes that do not cross a trust boundary can proceed without security design review.
Security review as a gatekeeping bottleneck. When the security team must approve every design before development can start, security becomes a scheduling constraint that teams work around rather than with. Instead, embed security knowledge in development teams (security champions), provide self-service design review checklists, and reserve the security team's direct involvement for high-risk features that cross trust boundaries.
Treating threat modeling as a document rather than a design influence. A threat model produced to satisfy a process requirement and then filed away provides no security value. The purpose of threat modeling is to change the design. If the threat model does not result in at least one design modification, backlog item, or accepted-risk decision, it was either done too late or not taken seriously.
The "security sprint" anti-pattern. Batching all security work into a dedicated sprint (usually before a release) means security issues accumulate for weeks, are rushed through in a compressed timeline, and the fixes are inadequately tested. Security is a continuous concern, not a batch process. Integrate security requirements into every sprint, address findings as they are discovered, and include security criteria in the definition of done for every story.
Relying solely on automated scanning without design-phase analysis. SAST and DAST tools find implementation bugs (SQL injection, XSS, buffer overflows) but cannot find architectural flaws (missing authorization checks, improper trust boundaries, insecure data flows, lack of rate limiting). A design that routes all traffic through a single unauthenticated API gateway is an architectural vulnerability that no scanner will detect. Design-phase analysis and automated scanning are complementary, not substitutes.
Security requirements as non-functional requirements. Labeling security as "non-functional" marginalizes it. Security requirements are functional constraints: "the API must reject requests without a valid authentication token" is as functional as "the API must return user data in JSON format." Treat security requirements with the same priority, tracking, and testing discipline as any other requirement.
One-time threat model never updated. A threat model created during initial design and never revisited becomes stale as the system evolves. New features, new integrations, and new threat intelligence change the risk landscape. Review and update threat models when significant changes are made to the system, or at minimum quarterly for high-risk systems.