From jleo-skills
Evaluates whether a law-economics-organization manuscript topic fits JLEO vs sibling journals, sharpening the institutional/organizational claim.
How this skill is triggered — by the user, by Claude, or both
Slash command
/jleo-skills:jleo-topic-selectionThe summary Claude sees in its skill listing — used to decide when to auto-load this skill
- You have a result or a model and are unsure whether JLEO is the right home versus JLE, JLS, ALER, or Organization Science
JLEO was founded in 1985 by Williamson and Mashaw to host the law-economics-organization synthesis, and its center of gravity has stayed there. A JLEO topic earns its place when the payoff is an institutional or organizational claim — about why a governance structure, contract form, or political institution takes the shape it does, and what follows. Run the candidate topic through these tests:
| You are holding | JLEO-fit move | Trap to avoid |
|---|---|---|
| A causal effect of a legal/regulatory rule | Recast the payoff as an institutional/governance claim, or send to JLE | Selling a market effect as if it were organizational |
| A make-or-buy / contract-form pattern in firm data | Frame as transaction-cost governance choice with selection acknowledged | Descriptive correlation with no governance logic |
| A formal model of a political institution | Tie comparative statics to a real legislature/court/agency; add a test or institutional case | A model with no institutional anchor (reads as pure theory) |
| An organizational/personnel finding inside firms | Position in the economics-of-organization line (agency, incentives), not org-behavior | Drifting into Organization Science's behavioral register |
| A historical-institutions / development result | Connect to credible-commitment / institutions-and-growth PPE canon | A history paper with no institutional-economics frame |
resources/official-source-map.md or marked 待核实A team has a clean estimate that a court reform sped up commercial dispute resolution. As a market-outcome paper ("faster courts raise local investment") this is a JLE candidate. The JLEO recast keeps the same data but makes the institutional object the payoff: the reform changed the governance of adjudication (specialized vs. generalist judges), and the paper asks which disputes the specialized structure economizes on — a transaction-cost question about the organization of the courts, not just a growth effect. Same finding, but now the contribution is about institutional design, and the audience that champions it is the JLEO institutional-economics community rather than applied-micro generalists.
【Journal】The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (JLEO)
【Skill】jleo-topic-selection
【Verdict】pass / revise / reroute (to JLE / JLS / ALER / Org Science / QJPS)
【Institutional object】the organization/institution the paper explains
【Mechanism (one sentence)】TCE / agency / commitment / separation-of-powers / hold-up / ...
【Tradition】transaction-cost-economics / theory-of-the-firm / positive-political-economy
【Sibling boundary】why JLEO and not the nearest neighbor
【Source status】verified URL / 待核实
【Next skill】jleo-literature-positioning
npx claudepluginhub brycewang-stanford/awesome-journal-skills --plugin jleo-skillsEvaluates manuscript fit for Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (JLEO) and helps frame papers at the law-economics-organization intersection, covering scope, method bar, and house style.
Routes manuscript workflow for JLEO submissions, directing users to the correct sub-skill based on current stage (e.g., topic selection, theory, identification, writing).
Evaluates whether a law-and-economics project fits JLE vs. sister journals and sharpens its central legal/regulatory question. Use when a project's venue or question scope is uncertain.