Analyzes crypto code in C/C++, Go, Rust, JavaScript/TypeScript, Python, and more for timing side-channels leaking secrets via non-constant-time ops.
From antigravity-awesome-skillsnpx claudepluginhub sickn33/antigravity-awesome-skills --plugin antigravity-awesome-skillsThis skill uses the workspace's default tool permissions.
Designs and optimizes AI agent action spaces, tool definitions, observation formats, error recovery, and context for higher task completion rates.
Enables AI agents to execute x402 payments with per-task budgets, spending controls, and non-custodial wallets via MCP tools. Use when agents pay for APIs, services, or other agents.
Compares coding agents like Claude Code and Aider on custom YAML-defined codebase tasks using git worktrees, measuring pass rate, cost, time, and consistency.
Analyze cryptographic code to detect operations that leak secret data through execution timing variations.
User writing crypto code? ──yes──> Use this skill
│
no
│
v
User asking about timing attacks? ──yes──> Use this skill
│
no
│
v
Code handles secret keys/tokens? ──yes──> Use this skill
│
no
│
v
Skip this skill
Concrete triggers:
/ or % operators on secret-derived valuessign, verify, encrypt, decrypt, derive_keyBased on the file extension or language context, refer to the appropriate guide:
| Language | File Extensions | Guide |
|---|---|---|
| C, C++ | .c, .h, .cpp, .cc, .hpp | references/compiled.md |
| Go | .go | references/compiled.md |
| Rust | .rs | references/compiled.md |
| Swift | .swift | references/swift.md |
| Java | .java | references/vm-compiled.md |
| Kotlin | .kt, .kts | references/kotlin.md |
| C# | .cs | references/vm-compiled.md |
| PHP | .php | references/php.md |
| JavaScript | .js, .mjs, .cjs | references/javascript.md |
| TypeScript | .ts, .tsx | references/javascript.md |
| Python | .py | references/python.md |
| Ruby | .rb | references/ruby.md |
# Analyze any supported file type
uv run {baseDir}/ct_analyzer/analyzer.py <source_file>
# Include conditional branch warnings
uv run {baseDir}/ct_analyzer/analyzer.py --warnings <source_file>
# Filter to specific functions
uv run {baseDir}/ct_analyzer/analyzer.py --func 'sign|verify' <source_file>
# JSON output for CI
uv run {baseDir}/ct_analyzer/analyzer.py --json <source_file>
# Cross-architecture testing (RECOMMENDED)
uv run {baseDir}/ct_analyzer/analyzer.py --arch x86_64 crypto.c
uv run {baseDir}/ct_analyzer/analyzer.py --arch arm64 crypto.c
# Multiple optimization levels
uv run {baseDir}/ct_analyzer/analyzer.py --opt-level O0 crypto.c
uv run {baseDir}/ct_analyzer/analyzer.py --opt-level O3 crypto.c
# Analyze Java bytecode
uv run {baseDir}/ct_analyzer/analyzer.py CryptoUtils.java
# Analyze Kotlin bytecode (Android/JVM)
uv run {baseDir}/ct_analyzer/analyzer.py CryptoUtils.kt
# Analyze C# IL
uv run {baseDir}/ct_analyzer/analyzer.py CryptoUtils.cs
Note: Java, Kotlin, and C# compile to bytecode (JVM/CIL) that runs on a virtual machine with JIT compilation. The analyzer examines the bytecode directly, not the JIT-compiled native code. The --arch and --opt-level flags do not apply to these languages.
# Analyze Swift for native architecture
uv run {baseDir}/ct_analyzer/analyzer.py crypto.swift
# Analyze for specific architecture (iOS devices)
uv run {baseDir}/ct_analyzer/analyzer.py --arch arm64 crypto.swift
# Analyze with different optimization levels
uv run {baseDir}/ct_analyzer/analyzer.py --opt-level O0 crypto.swift
Note: Swift compiles to native code like C/C++/Go/Rust, so it uses assembly-level analysis and supports --arch and --opt-level flags.
| Language | Requirements |
|---|---|
| C, C++, Go, Rust | Compiler in PATH (gcc/clang, go, rustc) |
| Swift | Xcode or Swift toolchain (swiftc in PATH) |
| Java | JDK with javac and javap in PATH |
| Kotlin | Kotlin compiler (kotlinc) + JDK (javap) in PATH |
| C# | .NET SDK + ilspycmd (dotnet tool install -g ilspycmd) |
| PHP | PHP with VLD extension or OPcache |
| JavaScript/TypeScript | Node.js in PATH |
| Python | Python 3.x in PATH |
| Ruby | Ruby with --dump=insns support |
macOS users: Homebrew installs Java and .NET as "keg-only". You must add them to your PATH:
# For Java (add to ~/.zshrc)
export PATH="/opt/homebrew/opt/openjdk@21/bin:$PATH"
# For .NET tools (add to ~/.zshrc)
export PATH="$HOME/.dotnet/tools:$PATH"
See references/vm-compiled.md for detailed setup instructions and troubleshooting.
| Problem | Detection | Fix |
|---|---|---|
| Division on secrets | DIV, IDIV, SDIV, UDIV | Barrett reduction or multiply-by-inverse |
| Branch on secrets | JE, JNE, BEQ, BNE | Constant-time selection (cmov, bit masking) |
| Secret comparison | Early-exit memcmp | Use crypto/subtle or constant-time compare |
| Weak RNG | rand(), mt_rand, Math.random | Use crypto-secure RNG |
| Table lookup by secret | Array subscript on secret index | Bit-sliced lookups |
PASSED - No variable-time operations detected.
FAILED - Dangerous instructions found. Example:
[ERROR] SDIV
Function: decompose_vulnerable
Reason: SDIV has early termination optimization; execution time depends on operand values
CRITICAL: Not every flagged operation is a vulnerability. The tool has no data flow analysis - it flags ALL potentially dangerous operations regardless of whether they involve secrets.
For each flagged violation, ask: Does this operation's input depend on secret data?
Identify the secret inputs to the function (private keys, plaintext, signatures, tokens)
Trace data flow from the flagged instruction back to inputs
Common false positive patterns:
// FALSE POSITIVE: Division uses public constant, not secret
int num_blocks = data_len / 16; // data_len is length, not content
// TRUE POSITIVE: Division involves secret-derived value
int32_t q = secret_coef / GAMMA2; // secret_coef from private key
Document your analysis for each flagged item
| Question | If Yes | If No |
|---|---|---|
| Is the operand a compile-time constant? | Likely false positive | Continue |
| Is the operand a public parameter (length, count)? | Likely false positive | Continue |
| Is the operand derived from key/plaintext/secret? | TRUE POSITIVE | Likely false positive |
| Can an attacker influence the operand value? | TRUE POSITIVE | Likely false positive |
Static Analysis Only: Analyzes assembly/bytecode, not runtime behavior. Cannot detect cache timing or microarchitectural side-channels.
No Data Flow Analysis: Flags all dangerous operations regardless of whether they process secrets. Manual review required.
Compiler/Runtime Variations: Different compilers, optimization levels, and runtime versions may produce different output.