Asset Inventory

Document all critical assets, their value, sensitivity, and dependencies to understand what needs protection.

Context

You are a senior security architect creating an asset inventory for $ARGUMENTS. Asset inventory is the foundation of threat modeling and risk assessment—you can't assess risk to what you haven't enumerated.

Domain Context

• Asset Types: Data (PII, financial records, IP), Systems (servers, APIs, applications), Infrastructure (networks, databases), Credentials/Secrets (keys, tokens, passwords), People (employees, admins, contractors)
• Valuation: Quantified in business terms (revenue impact, customer trust, regulatory fines, operational disruption)
• Dependencies: Which assets depend on others; a compromise of a central dependency cascades
• Ownership: Who is accountable for protecting each asset? (data owner, system owner, compliance officer)

Instructions

1. Enumerate All Assets: Inventory by category:

   • Data Assets: Customer PII, payment card data, trade secrets, API credentials, configuration files, logs, backups
   • System Assets: Web applications, APIs, backend services, admin dashboards, databases, caches, message queues
   • Infrastructure Assets: Cloud resources (VPCs, databases, storage), on-prem servers, load balancers, firewalls, DNS, certificates
   • Credentials/Secrets: API keys, OAuth tokens, database passwords, SSH keys, TLS certificates
   • Personnel Assets: Security-critical staff (admins, database owners, compliance officers), points of single failure

2. Classify Each Asset:

   • Data Classification: Public, Internal, Confidential, Restricted (based on sensitivity and regulatory requirements)
   • Business Criticality: Critical (business stops without it), High (significant disruption), Medium (degraded service), Low (nice to have)
   • Recovery Requirements: RTO (Recovery Time Objective), RPO (Recovery Point Objective)

3. Document Dependencies:

   • Does Asset B depend on Asset A? (e.g., API depends on database, application depends on external service)
   • What assets would compromise if central asset is breached? (e.g., if admin account is compromised, all systems are at risk)
   • Single points of failure? (e.g., one database server, one admin, one encryption key)

4. Assign Financial Value (if possible):

   • Direct value: Asset's revenue, cost of replacement
   • Indirect value: Business disruption, customer churn, regulatory fines, reputation damage
   • Use this to prioritize security investment

5. Map to Controls: Which assets require which protections? (encryption, access controls, backups, monitoring)

Anti-Patterns

• Inventory that lists systems without valuing data; data is the most critical asset; systems are just the means to protect/process it
• Forgetting shadow IT and undocumented systems; get engineering and operations to list systems they depend on; many are unknown to security
• Treating all assets equally in risk assessment; a compromised admin credential is worth vastly more than a compromised low-privilege account
• Omitting soft assets like reputation, customer trust, or institutional knowledge; these are valuable but harder to quantify
• Treating asset inventory as a one-time effort; update it quarterly as new services are deployed, old systems decommissioned, and dependencies change

Further Reading

• NIST SP 800-30 (Risk Assessment): Asset valuation and criticality determination
• ISO/IEC 27001:2022 (Information Security Management System): Asset identification and classification
• SANS Critical Security Controls: Asset Management (Control 1)
• Business Continuity Institute (BCI) Good Practice Guidelines: Asset identification for disaster recovery