Skill

hunting-for-registry-run-key-persistence

From asi

Detects MITRE ATT&CK T1547.001 registry Run key persistence by analyzing Sysmon Event ID 13 logs and chaining with process/file events to flag malicious auto-start entries.

Python

Powershell

security

npx claudepluginhub plurigrid/asi --plugin asi

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Detects MITRE ATT&CK T1547.001 registry Run key persistence by analyzing Sysmon Event ID 13 logs to identify suspicious auto-start entries like temp paths and LOLBins.

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hunting-for-registry-run-key-persistence

Analyzes Sysmon Event ID 13 logs and registry queries to detect MITRE ATT&CK T1547.001 Run key persistence, identifying malicious Windows auto-start entries. Useful for threat hunting in Sysmon-enabled environments.

3 files

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hunting-for-registry-persistence-mechanisms

Hunt for Windows registry persistence mechanisms including Run keys, Winlogon modifications, IFEO injection, and COM hijacking. For threat hunting, IR, and security assessments.

asi

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Last CommitApr 4, 2026

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Hunting for Registry Run Key Persistence

Overview

Registry Run keys (T1547.001) are one of the most commonly used persistence mechanisms by adversaries. When a program is added to a Run key in the Windows registry, it executes automatically when a user logs in. Attackers abuse keys under HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run, HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run, and their RunOnce counterparts to maintain persistence. Sysmon Event ID 13 (RegistryEvent - Value Set) captures registry value modifications including the target object path, the process that made the change, and the new value. Detection involves monitoring these events for suspicious executables in temp directories, encoded PowerShell commands, LOLBin paths, and processes that do not normally create Run key entries. Chaining Event 13 with Event 1 (Process Creation) and Event 11 (FileCreate) strengthens detection by confirming payload creation and execution.

When to Use

When investigating security incidents that require hunting for registry run key persistence
When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain
When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type
When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques

Prerequisites

Windows systems with Sysmon installed and configured to log Event ID 13
Sysmon config with RegistryEvent rules for Run/RunOnce keys
Python 3.9+ with json, xml.etree.ElementTree, re modules
SIEM or log aggregator collecting Sysmon logs (Splunk, Elastic, Sentinel)
Knowledge of legitimate auto-start programs for baseline comparison

Steps

Collect Sysmon Event ID 13 logs filtered for Run/RunOnce key paths
Parse event XML/JSON for TargetObject, Details (value written), Image (modifying process)
Flag entries where the value points to temp directories, AppData, or ProgramData
Detect encoded PowerShell commands or script interpreters in registry values
Identify LOLBin abuse (mshta.exe, rundll32.exe, regsvr32.exe, wscript.exe)
Compare against known-good baseline of legitimate auto-start entries
Check if the modifying process (Image) is unusual (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, python.exe)
Chain with Event ID 1 to verify if the registered binary was recently created
Generate detection report with MITRE ATT&CK mapping and severity scores
Produce Sigma/Splunk detection rules from findings

Expected Output

A JSON report listing suspicious Run key entries with the registry path, value written, modifying process, timestamp, MITRE technique mapping, severity rating, and recommended Sigma detection rules.