threat-modeling

Threat Modeling

Systematic approach to identifying, quantifying, and addressing security threats in software systems.

When to Use This Skill

Keywords: threat modeling, STRIDE, DREAD, attack trees, security design, risk assessment, threat analysis, data flow diagram, trust boundary, attack surface, threat enumeration

Use this skill when:

• Designing new systems or features
• Conducting security architecture reviews
• Identifying potential attack vectors
• Prioritizing security investments
• Documenting security assumptions
• Integrating security into SDLC
• Creating threat models as code

Quick Decision Tree

1. Starting a threat model? → Begin with Threat Modeling Process
2. Identifying threats? → Use STRIDE methodology
3. Prioritizing threats? → Apply DREAD scoring or Attack Trees
4. Automating threat models? → See references/threat-modeling-tools.md
5. Specific architecture patterns? → See Architecture-Specific Threats

Threat Modeling Process

┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                    THREAT MODELING WORKFLOW                      │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│                                                                  │
│  1. DECOMPOSE        2. IDENTIFY         3. PRIORITIZE          │
│  ┌──────────┐       ┌──────────┐        ┌──────────┐           │
│  │ System   │──────▶│ Threats  │───────▶│ Risks    │           │
│  │ Model    │       │ (STRIDE) │        │ (DREAD)  │           │
│  └──────────┘       └──────────┘        └──────────┘           │
│       │                   │                   │                  │
│       ▼                   ▼                   ▼                  │
│  ┌──────────┐       ┌──────────┐        ┌──────────┐           │
│  │ DFD      │       │ Attack   │        │ Counter- │           │
│  │ Trust    │       │ Trees    │        │ measures │           │
│  │ Boundary │       │ Patterns │        │ Backlog  │           │
│  └──────────┘       └──────────┘        └──────────┘           │
│                                                                  │
│  4. DOCUMENT ──────▶ 5. VALIDATE ──────▶ 6. ITERATE            │
│                                                                  │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

Step 1: System Decomposition

Create a Data Flow Diagram (DFD) with these elements:

Element	Symbol	Description
External Entity	Rectangle	Users, external systems
Process	Circle	Code that transforms data
Data Store	Parallel lines	Databases, files, caches
Data Flow	Arrow	Data movement
Trust Boundary	Dashed line	Security perimeter

// Example: E-commerce system decomposition
public enum ElementType
{
    ExternalEntity, Process, DataStore, DataFlow
}

/// <summary>Defines a security perimeter</summary>
public sealed record TrustBoundary(
    string Id,
    string Name,
    string Description,
    IReadOnlyList<string> Elements);  // IDs of contained elements

/// <summary>Data Flow Diagram element</summary>
public sealed record DfdElement
{
    public required string Id { get; init; }
    public required string Name { get; init; }
    public required ElementType ElementType { get; init; }
    public string? TrustBoundary { get; init; }
    public string Description { get; init; } = "";
}

/// <summary>Connection between elements</summary>
public sealed record DataFlow
{
    public required string Id { get; init; }
    public required string Source { get; init; }
    public required string Destination { get; init; }
    public required string DataType { get; init; }
    public required string Protocol { get; init; }
    public bool Encrypted { get; init; }
    public bool Authenticated { get; init; }
}

/// <summary>Complete system model for threat analysis</summary>
public sealed class SystemModel(string name)
{
    public string Name => name;
    private readonly Dictionary<string, DfdElement> _elements = new();
    private readonly List<DataFlow> _flows = [];
    private readonly List<TrustBoundary> _trustBoundaries = [];

    public IReadOnlyDictionary<string, DfdElement> Elements => _elements;
    public IReadOnlyList<DataFlow> Flows => _flows;
    public IReadOnlyList<TrustBoundary> TrustBoundaries => _trustBoundaries;

    public void AddElement(DfdElement element) => _elements[element.Id] = element;
    public void AddFlow(DataFlow flow) => _flows.Add(flow);
    public void AddTrustBoundary(TrustBoundary boundary) => _trustBoundaries.Add(boundary);

    /// <summary>Identify flows that cross trust boundaries - high-risk areas</summary>
    public IReadOnlyList<DataFlow> GetCrossBoundaryFlows()
    {
        var crossBoundary = new List<DataFlow>();
        foreach (var flow in _flows)
        {
            var sourceBoundary = _elements[flow.Source].TrustBoundary;
            var destBoundary = _elements[flow.Destination].TrustBoundary;
            if (sourceBoundary != destBoundary)
                crossBoundary.Add(flow);
        }
        return crossBoundary;
    }
}

// Example usage
var model = new SystemModel("E-Commerce Platform");

// Define elements
model.AddElement(new DfdElement
{
    Id = "user",
    Name = "Customer",
    ElementType = ElementType.ExternalEntity,
    TrustBoundary = "internet",
    Description = "End user accessing via browser"
});

model.AddElement(new DfdElement
{
    Id = "web_app",
    Name = "Web Application",
    ElementType = ElementType.Process,
    TrustBoundary = "dmz",
    Description = "Frontend web server"
});

model.AddElement(new DfdElement
{
    Id = "api",
    Name = "API Gateway",
    ElementType = ElementType.Process,
    TrustBoundary = "internal",
    Description = "Backend API services"
});

model.AddElement(new DfdElement
{
    Id = "db",
    Name = "Database",
    ElementType = ElementType.DataStore,
    TrustBoundary = "internal",
    Description = "Customer and order data"
});

// Define flows
model.AddFlow(new DataFlow
{
    Id = "f1",
    Source = "user",
    Destination = "web_app",
    DataType = "HTTP Request",
    Protocol = "HTTPS",
    Encrypted = true,
    Authenticated = false
});

// Find high-risk flows
var riskyFlows = model.GetCrossBoundaryFlows();

STRIDE Methodology

STRIDE is a threat classification framework for systematic threat identification:

Category	Threat	Security Property	Example
Spoofing	Impersonating someone/something	Authentication	Stolen credentials, session hijacking
Tampering	Modifying data or code	Integrity	SQL injection, file modification
Repudiation	Denying actions	Non-repudiation	Missing audit logs
Information Disclosure	Exposing information	Confidentiality	Data breach, verbose errors
Denial of Service	Disrupting availability	Availability	Resource exhaustion, DDoS
Elevation of Privilege	Gaining unauthorized access	Authorization	Privilege escalation, IDOR

STRIDE-per-Element Analysis

Apply STRIDE to each DFD element:

using System.Collections.Frozen;

public enum StrideCategory
{
    Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, InformationDisclosure, DenialOfService, ElevationOfPrivilege
}

/// <summary>Which STRIDE categories apply to which element types</summary>
public static class StrideApplicability
{
    public static readonly FrozenDictionary<ElementType, StrideCategory[]> Map =
        new Dictionary<ElementType, StrideCategory[]>
        {
            [ElementType.ExternalEntity] =
                [StrideCategory.Spoofing, StrideCategory.Repudiation],
            [ElementType.Process] =
                [StrideCategory.Spoofing, StrideCategory.Tampering, StrideCategory.Repudiation,
                 StrideCategory.InformationDisclosure, StrideCategory.DenialOfService,
                 StrideCategory.ElevationOfPrivilege],
            [ElementType.DataStore] =
                [StrideCategory.Tampering, StrideCategory.Repudiation,
                 StrideCategory.InformationDisclosure, StrideCategory.DenialOfService],
            [ElementType.DataFlow] =
                [StrideCategory.Tampering, StrideCategory.InformationDisclosure,
                 StrideCategory.DenialOfService]
        }.ToFrozenDictionary();
}

/// <summary>Identified threat</summary>
public sealed record Threat
{
    public required string Id { get; init; }
    public required StrideCategory Category { get; init; }
    public required string ElementId { get; init; }
    public required string Title { get; init; }
    public required string Description { get; init; }
    public required string AttackVector { get; init; }
    public string Impact { get; init; } = "";
    public string Likelihood { get; init; } = "Medium";
    public IReadOnlyList<string> Mitigations { get; init; } = [];
}

/// <summary>Threat template for generation</summary>
public sealed record ThreatTemplate(
    string TitleFormat, string DescriptionFormat, string AttackVector, string[] Mitigations);

/// <summary>Systematic STRIDE threat identification</summary>
public sealed class StrideAnalyzer(SystemModel model)
{
    private readonly List<Threat> _threats = [];
    private int _threatCounter;

    private static readonly Dictionary<(ElementType, StrideCategory), ThreatTemplate> Templates = new()
    {
        [(ElementType.Process, StrideCategory.Spoofing)] = new(
            "Spoofing of {0}",
            "Attacker impersonates {0} to gain unauthorized access",
            "Credential theft, session hijacking, certificate forgery",
            ["Strong authentication", "Certificate pinning", "Session management"]),
        [(ElementType.Process, StrideCategory.Tampering)] = new(
            "Tampering with {0}",
            "Attacker modifies data processed by {0}",
            "Input manipulation, code injection, memory corruption",
            ["Input validation", "Integrity checks", "Code signing"]),
        [(ElementType.DataStore, StrideCategory.InformationDisclosure)] = new(
            "Information disclosure from {0}",
            "Sensitive data exposed from {0}",
            "SQL injection, misconfiguration, backup exposure",
            ["Encryption at rest", "Access controls", "Data masking"])
    };

    /// <summary>Perform STRIDE analysis on all elements</summary>
    public IReadOnlyList<Threat> Analyze()
    {
        // Analyze elements
        foreach (var element in model.Elements.Values)
        {
            if (StrideApplicability.Map.TryGetValue(element.ElementType, out var categories))
            {
                foreach (var category in categories)
                    _threats.AddRange(IdentifyThreats(element, category));
            }
        }

        // Analyze data flows
        if (StrideApplicability.Map.TryGetValue(ElementType.DataFlow, out var flowCategories))
        {
            foreach (var flow in model.Flows)
            {
                foreach (var category in flowCategories)
                    _threats.AddRange(IdentifyFlowThreats(flow, category));
            }
        }

        return _threats;
    }

    private IEnumerable<Threat> IdentifyThreats(DfdElement element, StrideCategory category)
    {
        var key = (element.ElementType, category);
        if (!Templates.TryGetValue(key, out var template))
            yield break;

        _threatCounter++;
        yield return new Threat
        {
            Id = $"T{_threatCounter:D3}",
            Category = category,
            ElementId = element.Id,
            Title = string.Format(template.TitleFormat, element.Name),
            Description = string.Format(template.DescriptionFormat, element.Name),
            AttackVector = template.AttackVector,
            Mitigations = template.Mitigations
        };
    }

    private IEnumerable<Threat> IdentifyFlowThreats(DataFlow flow, StrideCategory category)
    {
        if (category == StrideCategory.InformationDisclosure && !flow.Encrypted)
        {
            _threatCounter++;
            yield return new Threat
            {
                Id = $"T{_threatCounter:D3}",
                Category = category,
                ElementId = flow.Id,
                Title = $"Unencrypted data flow: {flow.Source} -> {flow.Destination}",
                Description = $"Data ({flow.DataType}) transmitted without encryption",
                AttackVector = "Network sniffing, man-in-the-middle",
                Impact = "High - Data exposure",
                Mitigations = ["Enable TLS", "Use VPN", "Encrypt at application layer"]
            };
        }

        if (category == StrideCategory.Tampering && !flow.Authenticated)
        {
            _threatCounter++;
            yield return new Threat
            {
                Id = $"T{_threatCounter:D3}",
                Category = category,
                ElementId = flow.Id,
                Title = $"Unauthenticated data flow: {flow.Source} -> {flow.Destination}",
                Description = "Data flow lacks authentication - source cannot be verified",
                AttackVector = "Message injection, replay attacks",
                Impact = "Medium - Data integrity compromise",
                Mitigations = ["Mutual TLS", "Message signing", "API authentication"]
            };
        }
    }
}

For detailed STRIDE analysis with examples, see references/stride-methodology.md.

DREAD Risk Scoring

DREAD provides quantitative risk assessment for prioritization:

Factor	Description	Scale
Damage	Impact if exploited	1-10
Reproducibility	Ease of reproducing attack	1-10
Exploitability	Effort required to exploit	1-10
Affected Users	Scope of impact	1-10
Discoverability	Likelihood of finding vulnerability	1-10

/// <summary>DREAD risk scoring</summary>
public readonly struct DreadScore
{
    public int Damage { get; }           // 1-10
    public int Reproducibility { get; }  // 1-10
    public int Exploitability { get; }   // 1-10
    public int AffectedUsers { get; }    // 1-10
    public int Discoverability { get; }  // 1-10

    public DreadScore(int damage, int reproducibility, int exploitability,
                      int affectedUsers, int discoverability)
    {
        ValidateRange(damage, nameof(damage));
        ValidateRange(reproducibility, nameof(reproducibility));
        ValidateRange(exploitability, nameof(exploitability));
        ValidateRange(affectedUsers, nameof(affectedUsers));
        ValidateRange(discoverability, nameof(discoverability));

        Damage = damage;
        Reproducibility = reproducibility;
        Exploitability = exploitability;
        AffectedUsers = affectedUsers;
        Discoverability = discoverability;
    }

    private static void ValidateRange(int value, string name)
    {
        if (value is < 1 or > 10)
            throw new ArgumentOutOfRangeException(name, $"{name} must be between 1-10");
    }

    /// <summary>Calculate average DREAD score</summary>
    public double Total => (Damage + Reproducibility + Exploitability +
                           AffectedUsers + Discoverability) / 5.0;

    /// <summary>Categorize risk level</summary>
    public string RiskLevel => Total switch
    {
        >= 8 => "Critical",
        >= 6 => "High",
        >= 4 => "Medium",
        _ => "Low"
    };
}

/// <summary>Prioritize threats using DREAD scoring</summary>
public sealed class ThreatPrioritizer
{
    private readonly List<(Threat Threat, DreadScore Score)> _scoredThreats = [];

    public void ScoreThreat(Threat threat, DreadScore score) =>
        _scoredThreats.Add((threat, score));

    /// <summary>Return threats sorted by risk (highest first)</summary>
    public IReadOnlyList<(Threat Threat, DreadScore Score)> GetPrioritizedList() =>
        _scoredThreats.OrderByDescending(x => x.Score.Total).ToList();

    /// <summary>Generate risk matrix summary</summary>
    public Dictionary<string, List<string>> GenerateRiskMatrix()
    {
        var matrix = new Dictionary<string, List<string>>
        {
            ["Critical"] = [], ["High"] = [], ["Medium"] = [], ["Low"] = []
        };
        foreach (var (threat, score) in _scoredThreats)
            matrix[score.RiskLevel].Add(threat.Id);
        return matrix;
    }
}

// Example scoring
var sqlInjectionScore = new DreadScore(
    damage: 9,           // Full database compromise
    reproducibility: 8,  // Easily reproducible with tools
    exploitability: 7,   // Well-known techniques
    affectedUsers: 10,   // All users potentially affected
    discoverability: 6   // Requires testing to find
);

Console.WriteLine($"Risk Score: {sqlInjectionScore.Total}");    // 8.0
Console.WriteLine($"Risk Level: {sqlInjectionScore.RiskLevel}"); // Critical

Alternative: CVSS-Based Scoring

For compatibility with industry standards, map to CVSS:

/// <summary>CVSS 3.1 Base Score components</summary>
public sealed record CvssVector
{
    public required string AttackVector { get; init; }       // N, A, L, P
    public required string AttackComplexity { get; init; }   // L, H
    public required string PrivilegesRequired { get; init; } // N, L, H
    public required string UserInteraction { get; init; }    // N, R
    public required string Scope { get; init; }              // U, C
    public required string Confidentiality { get; init; }    // N, L, H
    public required string Integrity { get; init; }          // N, L, H
    public required string Availability { get; init; }       // N, L, H

    public string ToVectorString() =>
        $"CVSS:3.1/AV:{AttackVector}/AC:{AttackComplexity}/" +
        $"PR:{PrivilegesRequired}/UI:{UserInteraction}/" +
        $"S:{Scope}/C:{Confidentiality}/I:{Integrity}/A:{Availability}";
}

Attack Trees

Attack trees visualize how an attacker might achieve a goal:

                    ┌─────────────────────┐
                    │ Steal Customer Data │ (Goal)
                    └─────────────────────┘
                              │
              ┌───────────────┼───────────────┐
              │               │               │
              ▼               ▼               ▼
      ┌───────────┐   ┌───────────┐   ┌───────────┐
      │ SQL       │   │ Phishing  │   │ Insider   │
      │ Injection │   │ Attack    │   │ Threat    │
      │ [OR]      │   │ [OR]      │   │ [OR]      │
      └───────────┘   └───────────┘   └───────────┘
            │               │               │
      ┌─────┴─────┐   ┌─────┴─────┐   ┌─────┴─────┐
      │           │   │           │   │           │
      ▼           ▼   ▼           ▼   ▼           ▼
  ┌───────┐ ┌───────┐ ┌───────┐ ┌───────┐ ┌───────┐ ┌───────┐
  │Find   │ │Exploit│ │Send   │ │Harvest│ │Bribe  │ │Access │
  │Vuln   │ │Input  │ │Fake   │ │Creds  │ │Staff  │ │After  │
  │Endpoint│ │Field  │ │Emails │ │Site   │ │       │ │Hours  │
  │[AND]  │ │[AND]  │ │[AND]  │ │[AND]  │ │[OR]   │ │[OR]   │
  └───────┘ └───────┘ └───────┘ └───────┘ └───────┘ └───────┘

public enum NodeOperator
{
    And,  // All children must succeed
    Or    // Any child can succeed
}

/// <summary>Node in attack tree</summary>
public sealed class AttackNode
{
    public required string Id { get; init; }
    public required string Description { get; init; }
    public NodeOperator Operator { get; init; } = NodeOperator.Or;
    public double Cost { get; init; }           // Estimated attack cost
    public double Probability { get; init; } = 0.5;  // Success probability
    public string SkillRequired { get; init; } = "Medium";
    public List<AttackNode> Children { get; } = [];
    public List<string> Countermeasures { get; init; } = [];

    public void AddChild(AttackNode child) => Children.Add(child);

    /// <summary>Calculate probability based on operator and children</summary>
    public double CalculateProbability()
    {
        if (Children.Count == 0)
            return Probability;

        var childProbs = Children.Select(c => c.CalculateProbability()).ToList();

        if (Operator == NodeOperator.And)
        {
            // All must succeed - multiply probabilities
            return childProbs.Aggregate(1.0, (acc, p) => acc * p);
        }
        else // OR
        {
            // Any can succeed - 1 - (all fail)
            return 1.0 - childProbs.Aggregate(1.0, (acc, p) => acc * (1 - p));
        }
    }

    /// <summary>Calculate minimum attack cost</summary>
    public double CalculateMinCost()
    {
        if (Children.Count == 0)
            return Cost;

        var childCosts = Children.Select(c => c.CalculateMinCost()).ToList();

        if (Operator == NodeOperator.And)
        {
            // Must complete all - sum costs
            return childCosts.Sum();
        }
        else // OR
        {
            // Choose cheapest path
            return childCosts.Min();
        }
    }
}

/// <summary>Analyze attack trees for risk assessment</summary>
public sealed class AttackTreeAnalyzer(AttackNode root)
{
    /// <summary>Find the least expensive attack path</summary>
    public IReadOnlyList<AttackNode> FindCheapestPath() => FindPath(root, minimizeCost: true);

    /// <summary>Find the most probable attack path</summary>
    public IReadOnlyList<AttackNode> FindMostLikelyPath() => FindPath(root, minimizeCost: false);

    private static List<AttackNode> FindPath(AttackNode node, bool minimizeCost)
    {
        var path = new List<AttackNode> { node };

        if (node.Children.Count == 0)
            return path;

        if (node.Operator == NodeOperator.And)
        {
            // Must traverse all children
            foreach (var child in node.Children)
                path.AddRange(FindPath(child, minimizeCost));
        }
        else // OR
        {
            // Choose best child
            var bestChild = minimizeCost
                ? node.Children.MinBy(c => c.CalculateMinCost())!
                : node.Children.MaxBy(c => c.CalculateProbability())!;
            path.AddRange(FindPath(bestChild, minimizeCost));
        }

        return path;
    }

    /// <summary>Collect all countermeasures from tree</summary>
    public HashSet<string> GetAllCountermeasures() => CollectCountermeasures(root);

    private static HashSet<string> CollectCountermeasures(AttackNode node)
    {
        var measures = new HashSet<string>(node.Countermeasures);
        foreach (var child in node.Children)
            measures.UnionWith(CollectCountermeasures(child));
        return measures;
    }
}

// Example: Build attack tree
var rootNode = new AttackNode
{
    Id = "goal",
    Description = "Steal Customer Data",
    Operator = NodeOperator.Or
};

var sqlInjection = new AttackNode
{
    Id = "sqli",
    Description = "SQL Injection Attack",
    Operator = NodeOperator.And,
    Countermeasures = ["Parameterized queries", "WAF", "Input validation"]
};

sqlInjection.AddChild(new AttackNode
{
    Id = "find_vuln",
    Description = "Find vulnerable endpoint",
    Cost = 100,
    Probability = 0.7,
    SkillRequired = "Medium"
});

sqlInjection.AddChild(new AttackNode
{
    Id = "exploit",
    Description = "Exploit injection point",
    Cost = 200,
    Probability = 0.8,
    SkillRequired = "High"
});

rootNode.AddChild(sqlInjection);

// Analyze
var analyzer = new AttackTreeAnalyzer(rootNode);
Console.WriteLine($"Overall attack probability: {rootNode.CalculateProbability():P2}");
Console.WriteLine($"Minimum attack cost: ${rootNode.CalculateMinCost()}");
Console.WriteLine($"Countermeasures needed: {string.Join(", ", analyzer.GetAllCountermeasures())}");

Architecture-Specific Threats

Microservices Architecture

Component	Key Threats	Mitigations
API Gateway	DDoS, injection, auth bypass	Rate limiting, WAF, OAuth
Service Mesh	mTLS bypass, sidecar compromise	Certificate rotation, network policies
Message Queue	Message tampering, replay	Message signing, idempotency
Service Discovery	Registry poisoning	Secure registration, health checks

Serverless Architecture

Component	Key Threats	Mitigations
Functions	Cold start attacks, injection	Input validation, minimal permissions
Event Sources	Event injection, DoS	Source validation, rate limiting
Shared Tenancy	Noisy neighbor, data leakage	Isolation, encryption

Container/Kubernetes Architecture

Component	Key Threats	Mitigations
Container Runtime	Escape, privilege escalation	Rootless, seccomp, AppArmor
Orchestrator	API server compromise	RBAC, audit logging, network policies
Registry	Image tampering, supply chain	Image signing, vulnerability scanning

SDLC Integration

When to Threat Model

Phase	Activity	Output
Design	Initial threat model	Threat register, DFD
Development	Update for changes	Updated threats, security tests
Code Review	Verify mitigations	Security checklist
Testing	Validate mitigations	Penetration test plan
Release	Final review	Risk acceptance, residual risks
Operations	Incident analysis	Updated threat model

Lightweight Threat Modeling

For agile environments, use rapid threat modeling:

# threat-model.yaml - Minimal threat model per feature
feature: User Authentication
date: 2024-01-15
author: security-team

assets:
  - name: User credentials
    classification: Confidential
  - name: Session tokens
    classification: Internal

threats:
  - id: AUTH-001
    category: Spoofing
    description: Credential stuffing attack
    risk: High
    mitigation: Rate limiting, MFA, breach detection

  - id: AUTH-002
    category: Information Disclosure
    description: Token exposure in logs
    risk: Medium
    mitigation: Token redaction, structured logging

mitigations_implemented:
  - Argon2id password hashing
  - JWT with short expiration
  - Refresh token rotation

open_risks:
  - Legacy systems using MD5 (migration planned Q2)

Security Checklist

Before finalizing threat model:

• All trust boundaries identified
• STRIDE applied to each element
• Data flows across boundaries encrypted
• Authentication at trust boundary crossings
• Risks prioritized (DREAD/CVSS)
• Mitigations mapped to threats
• Residual risks documented
• Model reviewed by stakeholders
• Integration with issue tracking

References

• STRIDE Methodology Deep Dive - Detailed analysis with examples
• Threat Modeling Tools - pytm, threagile, automation

User-Facing Interface

When invoked directly by the user, this skill generates a structured threat model using STRIDE methodology.

Execution Workflow

1. Parse Arguments - Extract the component or feature description from $ARGUMENTS. If no arguments provided, ask the user what to threat model.
2. Understand the System - Identify assets, data flows, trust boundaries, and entry points.
3. Create Data Flow Diagram - Generate a DFD in Mermaid notation showing components, data flows, and trust boundaries.
4. Apply STRIDE Analysis - Analyze each component for Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service, and Elevation of Privilege threats.
5. Build Attack Trees - Create goal-oriented attack trees for high-value assets.
6. Score Risks - Apply DREAD methodology (Damage, Reproducibility, Exploitability, Affected Users, Discoverability) to prioritize threats.
7. Recommend Controls - Provide prioritized security control recommendations (Must Have / Should Have / Nice to Have).

Version History

• v1.0.0 (2025-12-26): Initial release with STRIDE, DREAD, attack trees, architecture patterns

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Last Updated: 2025-12-26