Security Threat Model

Table of Contents

1. Purpose
2. When to Use
3. What Is It
4. Workflow
5. STRIDE Framework
6. Trust Boundary Mapping
7. Common Patterns
8. Guardrails
9. Quick Reference

Purpose

Security Threat Modeling systematically identifies vulnerabilities, threats, and mitigations for systems handling sensitive data. It transforms ad-hoc security thinking into structured analysis using STRIDE methodology, trust boundary mapping, and defense-in-depth principles.

When to Use

Invoke this skill when you need to:

• Design secure architecture for systems handling sensitive data (PII, PHI, payment data, credentials)
• Review existing systems for security vulnerabilities before launch or audit
• Evaluate security implications of new features (auth, file uploads, APIs, integrations)
• Prepare for compliance requirements (PCI DSS, HIPAA, SOC 2, GDPR, FedRAMP)
• Investigate security incidents to identify root causes and prevent recurrence
• Assess third-party integration risks (OAuth, webhooks, data sharing)
• Document security posture for stakeholders, auditors, or customers
• Prioritize security improvements with limited resources

User phrases that trigger this skill:

• "Is this secure?"
• "What are the security risks?"
• "Threat model for [system]"
• "STRIDE analysis"
• "Trust boundaries"
• "Security review before launch"
• "Compliance requirements"

What Is It

A structured security analysis that:

1. Maps system architecture (components, data flows, trust boundaries)
2. Classifies data (sensitivity levels, compliance requirements, lifecycle)
3. Identifies threats using STRIDE (Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service, Elevation of Privilege)
4. Defines mitigations (preventive controls, detective controls, corrective controls)
5. Establishes monitoring (alerts, audit logs, incident response)
6. Prioritizes risks (likelihood × impact, exploitability, compliance)

Quick example (Password Reset Flow):

• Trust Boundaries: User → Web Server → Email Service → Database
• Data: Email address (PII), reset token (credential), user ID
• Threats:
  • Spoofing: Attacker requests reset for victim's email
  • Tampering: Token modified in email link
  • Information Disclosure: Token visible in logs/analytics
  • Denial of Service: Mass reset requests exhaust email quota
  • Elevation of Privilege: Reset token doesn't expire, reusable across sessions
• Mitigations: Rate limiting (5/hour), short-lived tokens (15 min), HTTPS only, email confirmation, account lockout after failed attempts, cryptographic token signing

Workflow

Copy this checklist and track your progress:

Security Threat Model Progress:
- [ ] Step 1: Map system architecture and data flows
- [ ] Step 2: Identify trust boundaries
- [ ] Step 3: Classify data and compliance requirements
- [ ] Step 4: Apply STRIDE to identify threats
- [ ] Step 5: Define mitigations, monitoring, and prioritize risks

Step 1: Map system architecture and data flows

Document components, external services, users, data stores, and communication paths. See Common Patterns for architecture examples. For straightforward systems → Use resources/template.md.

Step 2: Identify trust boundaries

Mark where data crosses security domains (user → server, server → database, internal → third-party). See Trust Boundary Mapping for boundary types.

Step 3: Classify data and compliance requirements

Rate data sensitivity (public, internal, confidential, restricted), identify PII/PHI/PCI, document compliance obligations (GDPR, HIPAA, PCI DSS). See resources/template.md for classification tables.

Step 4: Apply STRIDE to identify threats

For each trust boundary and data flow, systematically check all six STRIDE threat categories. See STRIDE Framework for threat identification. For complex systems with multiple attack surfaces → Study resources/methodology.md for advanced attack tree analysis and DREAD scoring.

Step 5: Define mitigations, monitoring, and prioritize risks

Propose preventive/detective/corrective controls, establish monitoring and alerting, prioritize by risk score (likelihood × impact). Self-check using resources/evaluators/rubric_security_threat_model.json. Minimum standard: Average score ≥ 3.5.

STRIDE Framework

S - Spoofing Identity

• Threat: Attacker impersonates legitimate user or system
• Examples: Stolen credentials, session hijacking, caller ID spoofing, email spoofing
• Mitigations: Multi-factor authentication, certificate validation, cryptographic signatures, mutual TLS

T - Tampering with Data

• Threat: Unauthorized modification of data in transit or at rest
• Examples: Man-in-the-middle attacks, SQL injection, file modification, message replay
• Mitigations: HTTPS/TLS, input validation, parameterized queries, digital signatures, checksums, immutable storage

R - Repudiation

• Threat: User denies performing action, no proof of activity
• Examples: Deleted logs, unsigned transactions, missing audit trails
• Mitigations: Comprehensive audit logging, digital signatures on transactions, tamper-proof logs, third-party timestamping

I - Information Disclosure

• Threat: Exposure of sensitive information to unauthorized parties
• Examples: Database dumps, verbose error messages, unencrypted backups, API over-fetching
• Mitigations: Encryption at rest/in transit, access control, data minimization, secure deletion, redaction in logs

D - Denial of Service

• Threat: System becomes unavailable or degraded
• Examples: Resource exhaustion, distributed attacks, algorithmic complexity exploits, storage filling
• Mitigations: Rate limiting, auto-scaling, circuit breakers, input size limits, CDN/DDoS protection

E - Elevation of Privilege

• Threat: Attacker gains unauthorized access or permissions
• Examples: SQL injection to admin, IDOR to other user data, path traversal, privilege escalation bugs
• Mitigations: Principle of least privilege, input validation, authorization checks on every request, role-based access control

Trust Boundary Mapping

Trust boundary: Where data crosses security domains with different trust levels.

Common boundaries:

• User → Application: Untrusted input enters system (validate, sanitize, rate limit)
• Application → Database: Application credentials vs. user permissions (parameterized queries, connection pooling)
• Internal → External Service: Data leaves your control (encryption, audit logging, contract terms)
• Public → Private Network: Internet to internal systems (firewall, VPN, API gateway)
• Client-side → Server-side: JavaScript to backend (never trust client, re-validate server-side)
• Privileged → Unprivileged Code: Admin functions vs. user code (isolation, separate processes, security boundaries)

Boundary analysis questions:

• What data crosses this boundary? (classify sensitivity)
• Who/what is on each side? (authentication, authorization)
• What could go wrong at this crossing? (apply STRIDE)
• What controls protect this boundary? (authentication, encryption, validation, rate limiting)

Common Patterns

Pattern 1: Web Application with Database

• Boundaries: User ↔ Web Server ↔ Database
• Critical threats: SQLi (Tampering), XSS (Spoofing), CSRF (Spoofing), session hijacking (Spoofing), IDOR (Elevation of Privilege)
• Key mitigations: Parameterized queries, CSP headers, CSRF tokens, HttpOnly/Secure cookies, authorization checks

Pattern 2: API with Third-Party OAuth

• Boundaries: User ↔ Frontend ↔ API Server ↔ OAuth Provider ↔ Third-Party API
• Critical threats: Token theft (Spoofing), scope creep (Elevation of Privilege), authorization code interception, redirect URI manipulation
• Key mitigations: PKCE for public clients, state parameter validation, token rotation, minimal scopes, HTTPS only

Pattern 3: Microservices Architecture

• Boundaries: API Gateway ↔ Service A ↔ Service B ↔ Message Queue ↔ Database
• Critical threats: Service impersonation (Spoofing), lateral movement (Elevation of Privilege), message tampering (Tampering), service enumeration (Information Disclosure)
• Key mitigations: mTLS between services, service mesh, API authentication per service, network policies, least privilege IAM

Pattern 4: File Upload Service

• Boundaries: User ↔ Upload Handler ↔ Virus Scanner ↔ Object Storage
• Critical threats: Malware upload (Tampering), path traversal (Information Disclosure), file overwrite (Tampering), storage exhaustion (DoS)
• Key mitigations: File type validation (magic bytes not extension), size limits, virus scanning, unique file naming, separate storage domain

Pattern 5: Mobile App with Backend API

• Boundaries: Mobile App ↔ API Gateway ↔ Backend Services
• Critical threats: API key extraction (Information Disclosure), certificate pinning bypass (Tampering), local data theft (Information Disclosure), reverse engineering
• Key mitigations: Certificate pinning, ProGuard/R8 obfuscation, biometric auth, local encryption (Keychain/Keystore), root/jailbreak detection

Guardrails

Assume breach mindset:

• Don't ask "can attacker get in?" but "when attacker gets in, what damage can they do?"
• Defense in depth: Multiple overlapping controls, no single point of failure
• Least privilege: Minimal permissions by default, explicit grants only

Prioritize realistically:

• Focus on high-value assets (customer data, credentials, financial data) first
• Address compliance-critical threats (PCI, HIPAA) before nice-to-haves
• Balance security cost vs. risk (don't over-engineer low-risk systems)

Avoid security theater:

• Security theater: Controls that feel secure but don't meaningfully reduce risk (e.g., password complexity without rate limiting = still vulnerable to credential stuffing)
• Effective security: Address actual threat vectors with measurable risk reduction

Document assumptions:

• "Assumes database is not publicly accessible" (validate with network config)
• "Assumes TLS 1.2+ enforced" (verify in load balancer settings)
• "Assumes environment variables protected" (confirm secrets management)

Update threat model:

• Threat models decay (new features, new attack techniques, infrastructure changes)
• Review quarterly or when architecture changes significantly
• Incorporate lessons from incidents and security research

Quick Reference

Resources:

• Quick threat model: resources/template.md
• Advanced techniques: resources/methodology.md (attack trees, DREAD scoring, abuse cases)
• Quality rubric: resources/evaluators/rubric_security_threat_model.json

5-Step Process: Map Architecture → Identify Boundaries → Classify Data → Apply STRIDE → Mitigate & Monitor

STRIDE: Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service, Elevation of Privilege

Trust Boundaries: User→App, App→DB, Internal→External, Public→Private, Client→Server, Privileged→Unprivileged

Mitigation Types: Preventive (block attacks), Detective (identify attacks), Corrective (respond to attacks)

Prioritization: High-value assets first, compliance-critical threats, realistic risk vs. cost balance