Implements OT-specific incident response playbooks using SANS PICERL, IEC 62443, and NIST SP 800-82 frameworks for ICS environments addressing safety-critical systems, downtime limits, and IT-OT coordination.
npx claudepluginhub killvxk/cybersecurity-skills-zhThis skill uses the workspace's default tool permissions.
- 首次为OT构建专用事件响应程序
Develops OT-specific incident response playbooks using SANS PICERL, IEC 62443, and NIST SP 800-82 for ICS safety, low downtime, and IT-OT coordination.
Develops OT/ICS incident response playbooks using SANS PICERL, IEC 62443, NIST SP 800-82 for safety-critical systems, limited downtime tolerance, and IT-OT coordination.
Performs OT network security assessments for SCADA/DCS/ICS using Purdue model, passive discovery of Modbus/DNP3/OPC UA/EtherNet/IP traffic to detect misconfigurations, unauthorized connections, and attack surfaces.
Share bugs, ideas, or general feedback.
不适用于无OT组件的纯IT事件响应（使用标准NIST 800-61剧本）、日常OT安全监控（参见implementing-dragos-platform-for-ot-monitoring），或桌面推演设计（参见performing-ics-tabletop-exercise）。
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""OT事件响应剧本引擎。
按照SANS PICERL生命周期，针对安全性、
可用性和跨团队协调的ICS特定考虑因素，
实施结构化的OT事件响应程序。
"""
import json
import sys
from datetime import datetime
from enum import Enum
from typing import Dict, List, Optional
class OTIncidentSeverity(Enum):
SEV1_SAFETY = "SEV1-SAFETY" # 安全系统受损
SEV2_PROCESS = "SEV2-PROCESS" # 主动过程操控
SEV3_ACCESS = "SEV3-ACCESS" # 未授权OT访问
SEV4_RECON = "SEV4-RECON" # OT网络侦察
SEV5_IT_SPILLOVER = "SEV5-IT-SPILLOVER" # 有OT暴露的IT事件
class OTIncidentCategory(Enum):
RANSOMWARE = "ransomware"
MALWARE_ICS = "malware_ics_specific"
UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS = "unauthorized_ot_access"
PROCESS_MANIPULATION = "process_manipulation"
SIS_COMPROMISE = "safety_system_compromise"
DATA_EXFILTRATION = "ot_data_exfiltration"
SUPPLY_CHAIN = "supply_chain_compromise"
INSIDER_THREAT = "insider_threat"
# OT的PICERL阶段定义
PICERL_PHASES = {
"preparation": {
"description": "事件发生前的准备工作",
"ot_specific": [
"维护所有PLC程序和HMI配置的离线备份",
"记录每个过程区域的安全关闭程序",
"建立带外通信（卫星电话、模拟无线电）",
"预置适用于气隙OT网络的取证工具",
"维护备用PLC和工程师工作站",
"每季度进行OT桌面推演",
],
},
"identification": {
"description": "检测并确认OT安全事件",
"ot_specific": [
"将OT IDS告警与历史数据中的过程异常相关联",
"验证过程偏差是由网络攻击还是操作原因引起",
"检查安全仪表系统（SIS）状态和完整性",
"审查工程师工作站日志中的未授权访问",
"检查PLC模式变化（RUN/STOP/PROGRAM转换）",
"评估事件是否仅限于IT或已蔓延到OT",
],
},
"containment": {
"description": "限制事件的蔓延和影响",
"ot_specific": [
"未经工厂运营批准，绝不关闭OT系统",
"在工业防火墙处隔离受影响网段（而非断电）",
"如怀疑远程操控，将PLC切换到本地/手动模式",
"在维持OT内部通信的同时断开DMZ处的IT-OT管道",
"在任何修复操作之前保留取证证据",
"在整个遏制过程中维持安全系统运行",
],
},
"eradication": {
"description": "从OT系统中清除威胁",
"ot_specific": [
"将运行中的PLC程序与已知良好备份进行比较",
"从黄金镜像重建被攻陷的工程师工作站",
"验证历史数据完整性以发现操控证据",
"检查OT特定位置的持久化机制（HMI上的启动脚本、计划任务）",
"验证PLC和RTU上的固件完整性",
"如需根套件级别修复，与ICS供应商协调",
],
},
"recovery": {
"description": "将OT运营恢复正常",
"ot_specific": [
"从经验证的离线备份恢复PLC程序",
"在工程监督下分阶段重启过程",
"在重启期间密切监控过程变量异常",
"在恢复自动操作前验证安全系统功能",
"仅在OT经验证清洁后重新启用IT-OT连接",
"记录事件期间任何过程变量漂移",
],
},
"lessons_learned": {
"description": "事件后审查和改进",
"ot_specific": [
"在2周内进行IT/OT联合事件后审查",
"根据观察到的攻击技术更新检测规则",
"如果横向移动成功，修订网络分段",
"根据实际恢复时间更新PLC备份计划",
"按要求向CISA ICS-CERT和行业ISAC报告",
"在90天内测试更新后的剧本",
],
},
}
class OTIncident:
"""表示一个活跃的OT安全事件。"""
def __init__(self, title: str, severity: OTIncidentSeverity,
category: OTIncidentCategory, affected_systems: List[str]):
self.id = f"OT-IR-{datetime.now().strftime('%Y%m%d-%H%M%S')}"
self.title = title
self.severity = severity
self.category = category
self.affected_systems = affected_systems
self.created = datetime.now().isoformat()
self.current_phase = "identification"
self.timeline = []
self.decisions = []
self.containment_actions = []
def log_event(self, phase: str, action: str, actor: str, notes: str = ""):
"""记录一个事件响应操作。"""
entry = {
"timestamp": datetime.now().isoformat(),
"phase": phase,
"action": action,
"actor": actor,
"notes": notes,
}
self.timeline.append(entry)
return entry
def log_decision(self, decision: str, rationale: str, approved_by: str):
"""记录事件响应期间的关键决策。"""
entry = {
"timestamp": datetime.now().isoformat(),
"decision": decision,
"rationale": rationale,
"approved_by": approved_by,
}
self.decisions.append(entry)
return entry
class OTPlaybookEngine:
"""执行OT事件响应剧本。"""
def __init__(self):
self.playbooks = self._build_playbooks()
def _build_playbooks(self) -> Dict:
"""构建特定类别的OT IR剧本。"""
return {
OTIncidentCategory.RANSOMWARE: {
"name": "OT勒索软件响应",
"reference": "SANS ICS勒索软件防御剧本",
"immediate_actions": [
"未经管理层和法务批准，不得支付赎金",
"立即在DMZ防火墙处断开IT-OT管道",
"验证SIS/安全系统是否独立运行",
"将关键过程切换到手动/本地控制",
"保留勒索信和加密文件样本用于取证",
"评估勒索软件是否已到达2级或以下",
],
"containment_steps": [
"通过禁用OT主机之间的SMB/RDP阻止横向移动",
"在维持关键过程通信的同时隔离受影响的VLAN",
"禁用OT环境的远程访问VPN",
"检查备份基础设施是否完好（勒索软件针对备份）",
"清点哪些OT系统被加密，哪些仍可运行",
],
"recovery_priority": [
"1. 安全仪表系统（SIS）",
"2. 关键过程控制器（连续过程中的PLC）",
"3. 供操作员查看的HMI",
"4. 数据连续性历史服务器",
"5. 工程师工作站",
"6. IT-OT连接（最后）",
],
"reporting": [
"CISA：按CIRCIA要求在72小时内报告",
"行业ISAC：在24小时内共享IOC",
"NERC（如适用）：对BES影响在1小时内报告",
],
},
OTIncidentCategory.SIS_COMPROMISE: {
"name": "安全系统受损响应",
"reference": "TRITON/TRISIS事件经验教训",
"immediate_actions": [
"立即通知过程安全团队",
"验证物理安全装置功能正常（泄压阀、防爆片）",
"如SIS完整性不确定，考虑受控过程关闭",
"将SIS网络与所有其他网络隔离",
"检查SIS是否处于旁路模式或已被解除武装",
"联系SIS供应商紧急支持（Schneider Triconex、HIMA等）",
],
"containment_steps": [
"将SIS工程师工作站从网络物理断开",
"采集SIS工程师工作站的取证镜像",
"根据出厂基线验证SIS控制器固件和逻辑",
"检查是否有未授权的TriStation/安全协议连接",
"检查所有工程师工作站的TRITON指标",
],
"recovery_priority": [
"1. 验证所有物理安全屏障完好",
"2. 从离线备份（与供应商基线对比验证）重载SIS逻辑",
"3. 重新投用前进行完整的SIS验证测试",
"4. 由过程安全工程师进行独立验证",
],
"reporting": [
"CISA ICS-CERT：针对SIS攻击立即通知",
"过程安全监管机构（OSHA、HSE）：按司法管辖区要求",
"SIS供应商：联系进行根本原因分析",
],
},
}
def execute_playbook(self, incident: OTIncident):
"""为事件执行适当的剧本。"""
playbook = self.playbooks.get(incident.category)
if not playbook:
print(f"[!] 没有针对 {incident.category.value} 的特定剧本。使用通用OT IR程序。")
return
print(f"\n{'='*70}")
print(f"OT事件响应剧本已激活")
print(f"{'='*70}")
print(f"事件ID: {incident.id}")
print(f"标题: {incident.title}")
print(f"严重程度: {incident.severity.value}")
print(f"类别: {incident.category.value}")
print(f"剧本: {playbook['name']}")
print(f"参考: {playbook['reference']}")
print(f"激活时间: {incident.created}")
print(f"受影响系统: {', '.join(incident.affected_systems)}")
print(f"\n--- 即时行动（在前15分钟内执行）---")
for i, action in enumerate(playbook["immediate_actions"], 1):
print(f" {i}. {action}")
print(f"\n--- 遏制步骤 ---")
for i, step in enumerate(playbook["containment_steps"], 1):
print(f" {i}. {step}")
print(f"\n--- 恢复优先级顺序 ---")
for item in playbook["recovery_priority"]:
print(f" {item}")
print(f"\n--- 报告要求 ---")
for req in playbook["reporting"]:
print(f" - {req}")
# 打印PICERL阶段指引
print(f"\n--- PICERL阶段检查清单 ---")
for phase, info in PICERL_PHASES.items():
print(f"\n [{phase.upper()}] {info['description']}")
for item in info["ot_specific"][:3]:
print(f" - {item}")
if __name__ == "__main__":
engine = OTPlaybookEngine()
# 示例：OT勒索软件事件
incident = OTIncident(
title="在3级历史服务器上检测到勒索软件",
severity=OTIncidentSeverity.SEV2_PROCESS,
category=OTIncidentCategory.RANSOMWARE,
affected_systems=["HIST-01", "HIST-02", "ENG-WS-03", "HMI-AREA1"],
)
engine.execute_playbook(incident)
| 术语 | 定义 |
|---|---|
| PICERL | SANS事件响应生命周期：准备（Preparation）、识别（Identification）、遏制（Containment）、清除（Eradication）、恢复（Recovery）、经验教训（Lessons Learned） |
| ICS4ICS | 工业控制系统事件指挥系统 - 将FEMA ICS适配到OT网络安全响应 |
| 安全仪表系统（SIS） | 防止危险条件的独立安全控制器；SIS被攻陷可能造成人身伤害 |
| 手动/本地模式（Manual/Local Mode） | 使用本地面板控制操作PLC而非远程SCADA；当远程访问被攻陷时使用 |
| CIRCIA | 关键基础设施网络事件报告法案，要求在72小时内向CISA报告 |
| 已知良好备份（Known-Good Backup） | 经验证的PLC程序和配置离线副本，用作恢复的可信基线 |
背景：勒索软件加密企业IT系统，并通过防护不足的IT/OT管道蔓延到3级历史服务器。2级HMI开始显示连接错误。
处理方法：
注意事项：不要关闭PLC来"保护"它们免受勒索软件影响 — PLC运行固件而非Windows，通常不受勒索软件影响。关闭PLC会中断物理过程。在IT侧完全修复之前，切勿重新连接IT-OT管道。
OT事件响应报告
==============================
事件ID: OT-IR-YYYYMMDD-HHMMSS
严重程度: SEV[1-5]
类别: [类别]
状态: [活跃/已遏制/已清除/已恢复/已关闭]
时间线:
[时间戳] - [阶段] - [操作] - [执行人]
受影响系统:
安全系统: [状态]
过程控制器: [状态]
HMI/SCADA: [状态]
历史服务器: [状态]
决策日志:
[时间戳] - [决策] - [理由] - [批准人]
已采取的遏制措施:
1. [操作和时间戳]
恢复状态:
[系统] - [已恢复/待恢复] - [预计完成时间]