Validating CSRF Protection

Overview

Validate Cross-Site Request Forgery protection across web application endpoints, forms, and API routes. This skill examines synchronizer token patterns, double-submit cookie implementations, SameSite cookie attributes, Origin/Referer header validation, and custom header requirements to identify state-changing operations vulnerable to CSRF attacks.

Prerequisites

• Access to the target codebase and configuration files in ${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/
• Familiarity with the web framework in use (Express, Django, Rails, Spring, Laravel, etc.)
• Standard shell utilities and Grep/Glob available for codebase scanning
• Reference: ${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/references/README.md for CSRF protection methods, OWASP CSRF Prevention Cheat Sheet, and framework-specific API examples

Instructions

1. Inventory all state-changing endpoints by scanning for POST, PUT, PATCH, and DELETE route handlers using Grep. Include form action attributes in HTML templates, AJAX calls in JavaScript, and API route definitions.
2. For each state-changing endpoint, verify that at least one CSRF protection mechanism is in place: synchronizer token, double-submit cookie, SameSite cookie attribute, Origin validation, or custom header requirement.
3. Validate synchronizer token implementation: confirm tokens are generated server-side using a CSPRNG, bound to the user session, included in forms as hidden fields or request headers, and validated on every state-changing request. Flag tokens that are static, predictable, or reused across sessions as CWE-352 (Cross-Site Request Forgery).
4. Check double-submit cookie patterns: verify the cookie value matches the request body or header value, the cookie uses Secure and HttpOnly attributes, and the comparison is timing-safe to prevent token extraction.
5. Assess SameSite cookie attributes on session cookies: verify SameSite=Strict or SameSite=Lax is set. Flag SameSite=None without Secure as severity high. Note that SameSite=Lax permits top-level GET navigations, which may be insufficient for GET endpoints that trigger state changes.
6. Verify Origin/Referer header validation: check that the server validates the Origin header against an allowlist on state-changing requests. Flag implementations that fall back to no protection when the header is absent.
7. For API endpoints using token-based auth (JWT in Authorization header), confirm that cookies are not also sent -- if cookies are used alongside bearer tokens, CSRF protection remains necessary.
8. Check for CSRF bypass vectors: look for state-changing GET endpoints, JSONP endpoints, content-type sniffing (missing Content-Type enforcement), and Flash/Silverlight crossdomain.xml files.
9. Classify each finding by severity (critical for unprotected financial/admin endpoints, high for other state-changing endpoints, medium for defense-in-depth gaps).
10. Generate remediation guidance with framework-specific CSRF middleware configuration examples.

Output

• Endpoint inventory: Table of all state-changing endpoints with their CSRF protection status (Protected, Partially Protected, Unprotected)
• Findings report: Each finding includes severity, CWE-352 reference, affected endpoint/file, attack scenario description, and remediation code
• Protection coverage: Percentage of state-changing endpoints with validated CSRF protection
• SameSite cookie audit: Table of all session/auth cookies with their SameSite, Secure, HttpOnly, and Path attributes
• Remediation guide: Framework-specific middleware setup (e.g., csurf for Express, @csrf_protect for Django, csrf_meta_tags for Rails)

Error Handling

Error	Cause	Solution
No state-changing endpoints found	Unconventional routing patterns or SPA architecture	Check for client-side routing frameworks (React Router, Vue Router) and trace API calls from frontend code
CSRF middleware detected but not applied globally	Middleware applied per-route rather than globally	Verify every state-changing route has the middleware applied; flag gaps in coverage
Token generation source unclear	Framework abstracts CSRF token generation	Check framework documentation for default CSPRNG usage; inspect framework source if needed
SameSite attribute not set in code	Cookie attributes set at infrastructure layer	Check reverse proxy, load balancer, or CDN cookie rewriting rules
Mixed protection strategies	Different endpoints use different CSRF mechanisms	Document each strategy and verify consistency; recommend standardizing on one approach

Examples

Express.js CSRF Token Validation

Scan ${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/src/routes/ for router.post and router.put handlers. Verify each includes csurf middleware or equivalent token validation. Flag any POST handler that directly processes req.body without csrfProtection middleware as CWE-352, severity critical for financial operations, high for other state changes.

Django CSRF Middleware Audit

Grep ${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/settings.py for django.middleware.csrf.CsrfViewMiddleware in the MIDDLEWARE list. Scan views for @csrf_exempt decorators -- flag each exempted view as a potential CSRF vulnerability requiring justification. Verify templates include {% csrf_token %} in all form tags.

SPA + API CSRF Assessment

For a React frontend calling a REST API, verify that the API enforces a custom header requirement (e.g., X-Requested-With) or uses double-submit cookies. Check that the SPA reads the CSRF token from a cookie and includes it in the X-CSRF-Token header. Flag API endpoints that accept application/x-www-form-urlencoded without CSRF validation as severity high (exploitable via HTML forms).

Resources

• OWASP CSRF Prevention Cheat Sheet
• CWE-352: Cross-Site Request Forgery
• SameSite Cookies Explained
• OWASP Testing for CSRF (OTG-SESS-005)
• Synchronizer Token Pattern