Audit Security

"Security is not a feature -- it is a property of the entire system."

Performs a 6-category security scan on a Claude Code plugin: secret patterns, path security, hook command injection, sensitive files, and script safety. Produces a severity-classified report with specific remediation for each finding. [EXPLICIT]

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Procedure

1. Receive target plugin path -- accept the plugin root directory as input. Confirm the directory exists and contains a plugin.json (or .claude-plugin/plugin.json) or recognizable plugin structure before proceeding. [EXPLICIT]

2. Secret pattern detection -- scan all files for high-risk credential patterns:

   • API keys: sk-*, AKIA*, ghp_*, xox[bsp]-*
   • Generic secrets: password\s*=, secret\s*=, token\s*= (outside comments)
   • Private keys: BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY, BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY, BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY
   • .env files containing KEY=, SECRET=, TOKEN=, PASSWORD=
   • Classify each match as CRITICAL severity. [EXPLICIT]

3. Path security analysis -- search for hardcoded or unsafe path usage:

   • Absolute user paths: /Users/, /home/, /opt/, C:\
   • Path traversal patterns: ../ outside of comments and documentation
   • Missing ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT} -- flag any path that should be relative but is absolute
   • Classify hardcoded paths as WARNING, traversal as CRITICAL. [EXPLICIT]

4. Hook command security -- inspect all hook definitions for shell injection risks:

   • eval usage in hook commands
   • Backtick substitution in hook command strings
   • Unquoted variable expansion ($VAR instead of "$VAR")
   • Commands piped to sh, bash, or exec
   • Classify injection vectors as CRITICAL. [EXPLICIT]

5. Sensitive file detection -- glob for files that should not be in a plugin:

   • .env, .env.*
   • .pem, .key, .p12, .pfx
   • credentials.json, service-account.json
   • id_rsa, id_ed25519, *.pub (private key pairs)
   • Classify presence as CRITICAL. [EXPLICIT]

6. Script security -- evaluate shell scripts in scripts/ and hooks:

   • World-writable permissions (mode o+w)
   • Downloads without validation: curl or wget without checksum or signature verification
   • Use of chmod 777
   • Classify unsafe scripts as WARNING, unvalidated downloads as CRITICAL. [EXPLICIT]

7. Generate security report -- compile all findings into a structured list with:

   • Severity level (CRITICAL / WARNING / INFO)
   • File path and line number
   • Pattern matched
   • Recommended remediation
   • Summary counts by severity

Quality Criteria

• Every finding includes the exact file path, line number, and matched pattern.
• Zero false positives from comments, documentation, or example strings -- context is checked.
• All six detection categories are executed; none silently skipped.
• The report clearly separates CRITICAL from WARNING from INFO findings.
• Remediation advice is specific and actionable (not generic "fix this").

Assumptions & Limits

• Read-only. This skill never modifies, deletes, or quarantines files.
• Pattern-based detection only -- cannot detect secrets that are obfuscated, encrypted, or split across multiple variables.
• False positive rate on generic patterns (e.g., password=) in documentation or example files is mitigated by context checking, but edge cases remain.
• Does not execute hook commands to test for runtime injection -- only static analysis of command strings.
• Scoped to the plugin root directory only. Files outside the plugin tree are not scanned even if symlinked into it.

Good vs Bad

Bad finding:

WARNING: Possible secret found. [EXPLICIT]

Missing: no file path, no line number, no pattern, no remediation. [EXPLICIT]

Good finding:

CRITICAL | hooks/hooks.json:12 | Pattern: `sk-proj-*` (OpenAI API key) | Remediation: Remove the key, rotate it immediately, and use environment variables instead. [EXPLICIT]

Includes: severity, exact file and line, matched pattern with classification, specific remediation. [EXPLICIT]

Anti-Patterns

1. Grep-and-forget -- running a single grep for "password" without context filtering, producing dozens of false positives from documentation. [EXPLICIT]
2. Severity inflation -- marking every finding as CRITICAL regardless of actual exploitability. [EXPLICIT]
3. Ignoring hook commands -- only scanning static files while hook commands may execute arbitrary shell code. [EXPLICIT]
4. Skipping binary/non-text files -- failing to detect .pem or .key files because only text content was searched. [EXPLICIT]
5. No traversal check -- assuming all ../ usage is benign because "it's in a comment" without actually verifying. [EXPLICIT]

Edge Cases

1. Plugin with zero scripts -- skip script security phase gracefully, note "no scripts found" in report rather than erroring. [EXPLICIT]
2. Obfuscated secrets -- base64-encoded credentials or secrets split across multiple lines. Flag suspicious base64 blobs (>40 chars) as INFO for manual review. [EXPLICIT]
3. Monorepo with multiple plugins -- ensure scanning is scoped to the specified plugin root, not the entire repository. [EXPLICIT]
4. Template variables -- patterns like ${API_KEY} or <YOUR_TOKEN> in example files should be classified as INFO, not CRITICAL, since they are placeholders. [EXPLICIT]

Usage

Example invocations:

• "/audit-security" — Run the full audit security workflow
• "audit security on this project" — Apply to current context