From appsec
This skill should be used when the user asks to "map to ATT&CK", "show attack techniques", "MITRE mapping", or wants to understand how findings relate to real-world attacker behavior. Maps security findings to MITRE ATT&CK tactics, techniques, and procedures.
npx claudepluginhub florianbuetow/claude-code --plugin appsecThis skill uses the workspace's default tool permissions.
Post-analysis enrichment tool that maps existing security findings to the
Acquire memory dumps from live systems/VMs and analyze with Volatility 3 for processes, networks, DLLs, injections in incident response or malware hunts.
Provides x86-64/ARM disassembly patterns, calling conventions, control flow recognition for static analysis of executables and compiled binaries.
Identifies anti-debugging checks like IsDebuggerPresent, NtQueryInformationProcess in Windows binaries; suggests bypasses via patches/hooks/scripts for malware analysis, CTFs, authorized RE.
Post-analysis enrichment tool that maps existing security findings to the MITRE ATT&CK framework. This skill does NOT discover new vulnerabilities. It takes findings produced by other skills (OWASP, STRIDE, SANS/CWE Top 25) and enriches them with ATT&CK tactics, techniques, attack chain analysis, and threat actor TTP cross-references.
This skill operates on findings, not on source code directly.
Read ../../shared/schemas/flags.md for the
full flag specification. This skill supports the following flags.
| Flag | Skill-Specific Behavior |
|---|---|
--scope | Not used directly. Findings are sourced from prior analysis or .appsec/findings.json. |
--depth | Controls enrichment depth. standard maps techniques. deep builds kill chains. expert adds threat actor TTPs and DREAD scoring. |
--severity | Filter input findings before mapping. Only findings at or above this severity are processed. |
--format | Applied to final output. |
--quiet | Mappings only, suppress narrative descriptions. |
--explain | Add detailed ATT&CK context and learning material per mapping. |
Read ../../shared/frameworks/mitre-attck.md
for the full MITRE ATT&CK specification including tactic definitions,
technique descriptions, code-level patterns, cross-framework mapping tables,
and kill chain construction guidance.
Collect existing findings from one or more sources, checked in priority order:
/appsec:owasp or /appsec:stride), use those..appsec/findings.json for persisted findings.If no findings are available, inform the user and suggest running
/appsec:owasp, /appsec:stride, or /appsec:sans25 first.
Verify each finding conforms to shared/schemas/findings.md. Ensure
required fields are present (id, title, severity, location.file,
description). Discard malformed entries with a warning.
Normalize existing cross-references for mapping priority:
references.cwe — primary key for ATT&CK mapping.references.owasp — secondary, via OWASP-to-ATT&CK table.references.stride — tertiary, via STRIDE-to-ATT&CK table.For each finding, determine applicable ATT&CK techniques using the
cross-framework mapping tables in mitre-attck.md:
description and title keywords against technique descriptions.For each mapped technique, record technique_id, technique_name,
tactic_id, and tactic_name. Update references.mitre_attck with the
primary technique ID.
Each technique belongs to one or more tactics. Produce a matrix showing which tactics each finding touches:
| Finding ID | Recon | Initial Access | Execution | Priv Esc | Cred Access | Collection | Exfiltration | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| INJ-001 | T1190 | T1059 | T1552 | T1005 | T1041 | T1485 | ||
| AUTH-003 | T1589 | T1078 | T1548 | T1110 |
Group findings that chain into multi-step attack scenarios from reconnaissance through impact. For each chain:
CHAIN-001: SQL Injection to Data Exfiltration
Severity: critical
Steps:
1. [INJ-001] SQL injection in /api/users (T1190 -> Initial Access)
2. [INJ-001] Database dump via UNION SELECT (T1005 -> Collection)
3. [CRYPT-002] Credentials stored in plaintext (T1552 -> Credential Access)
4. [AUTH-003] No MFA on admin portal (T1078 -> Privilege Escalation)
Impact: Full database compromise, credential theft, admin takeover
Produce a text-based kill chain diagram mapping findings onto Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill Chain stages aligned with ATT&CK tactics:
Reconnaissance Initial Access Execution Collection Exfiltration
| | | | |
v v v v v
[T1595 Scan] -> [T1190 SQLi] --> [T1059 Cmd] -> [T1005 Dump] -> [T1041 Exfil]
INJ-001 INJ-001 INJ-001
|
v
[T1552 Creds] -> [T1078 Acct] -> [T1548 Priv]
CRYPT-002 AUTH-003 AUTH-003
For --format json, produce a structured chain object with nodes and edges.
Available at --depth deep and --depth expert. For each technique, note
which threat actor groups commonly use it:
| Technique | Known Usage |
|---|---|
| T1190 Exploit Public-Facing App | APT28, APT41, Lazarus Group, FIN7, most initial access brokers |
| T1078 Valid Accounts | APT29, APT41, FIN6 -- commonly after credential theft |
| T1552 Unsecured Credentials | APT33, FIN7 -- harvesting from config files |
| T1505.003 Web Shell | APT41, Hafnium -- persistent access via uploaded shells |
This is NOT a threat intelligence assessment. It shows that identified techniques are actively used in real-world attacks.
{
"tool": "mitre",
"input_findings": 12,
"mapped_findings": 10,
"unmapped_findings": 2,
"techniques_identified": 8,
"tactics_covered": 6,
"attack_chains": 2,
"tactic_coverage": {
"reconnaissance": ["T1595"],
"initial_access": ["T1190", "T1078"],
"execution": ["T1059"],
"credential_access": ["T1552", "T1110"],
"collection": ["T1005"],
"exfiltration": ["T1041"],
"impact": ["T1485"]
},
"chains": [ ... ],
"enriched_findings": [ ... ]
}
Output the report in the requested --format. Include:
If --depth expert is set, additionally:
Read ../../shared/frameworks/dread.md
for DREAD scoring criteria. Assign a DREAD score to each attack chain.
Threat actor profiling: For each chain, identify the most likely threat actor class (opportunistic, insider, APT, nation-state) based on complexity and resources required.
Detection gap analysis: For each technique in a chain, assess whether the codebase has logging or alerting to detect the attack at that stage. Cross-reference with OWASP A09 findings if available. Flag chains where multiple stages lack detection as highest priority.
Mitigation roadmap: For each chain, produce a prioritized list of mitigations that break the chain at the earliest stage. Prefer mitigations that break multiple chains simultaneously.
Append expert findings with prefix ATK and metadata.tool set to
"mitre-attck".