code-injection-codegen

Code Injection via Code Generation

When to Use

Audit any package that dynamically generates or evaluates code — schema validators, template engines, expression evaluators, serializers with code generation, JIT compilers, query builders that emit JavaScript.

This is the highest-yield vulnerability class for CVE hunting. ~90% acceptance rate when confirmed.

Key Insight

Code generation packages often interpolate user-controlled values directly into generated code strings. Unlike template injection (where user input goes INTO a template), here user input becomes PART of the generated code itself.

Process

Step 1: Find Code Evaluation Sinks

Search for all dynamic code execution:

# JavaScript/TypeScript
grep -rn "new Function\(" .
grep -rn "eval(" .
grep -rn "vm\.run" .
grep -rn "vm\.compileFunction" .
grep -rn "setTimeout(" . | grep -v "setTimeout(function"
grep -rn "setInterval(" . | grep -v "setInterval(function"
grep -rn "new AsyncFunction" .
grep -rn "script\.runIn" .

# Python
grep -rn "eval(" .
grep -rn "exec(" .
grep -rn "compile(" . | grep -v "re.compile"

# Ruby
grep -rn "\.eval\b" .
grep -rn "instance_eval" .
grep -rn "class_eval" .

# PHP
grep -rn "eval(" .
grep -rn "assert(" .
grep -rn "create_function" .
grep -rn "preg_replace.*\/e" .

Step 2: Trace Data Flow to Sink

For each sink found:

1. Identify what string is being evaluated
2. Trace backwards — is any part of that string derived from user input?
3. Check for template literals: new Function(`return ${userInput}`)
4. Check for string concatenation: new Function("return " + userInput)
5. Check for variable interpolation in generated code

Step 3: Check for Block Comment Escape

JSON.stringify does NOT escape */. If generated code wraps values in block comments:

// VULNERABLE PATTERN:
let code = `/* ${JSON.stringify(userValue)} */ actual_code_here`;
// Attacker input: */ malicious_code /*
// Result: /* */ malicious_code /* */ actual_code_here

Search for this pattern:

grep -rn "\/\*.*JSON\.stringify" .
grep -rn "\/\*.*\$\{" .

Step 4: Check for Incomplete Escaping

Common mistakes:

• Escaping single quotes but not backticks (template literals)
• Escaping backslash but not newlines (line injection)
• Using JSON.stringify but not escaping </script> in HTML context
• Escaping in the value but not in the key (object property names)

Step 5: Verify Exploitability

1. Can the attacker control the interpolated value?
2. Does the generated code get executed (not just constructed)?
3. What is the execution context? (Node.js process = RCE, browser = XSS)
4. Is there any sandboxing? (node:vm is NOT security — see sandbox-escape skill)

Vulnerable Patterns

Pattern 1: Template Literal in new Function()

// Schema validator generating validation function
function createValidator(schema) {
  const code = `return function(value) {
    if (typeof value !== "${schema.type}") throw new Error("invalid");
  }`;
  return new Function(code)();
}
// Exploit: schema.type = '"; }); process.mainModule.require("child_process").execSync("id"); //'

Pattern 2: String Concatenation in eval()

// Expression evaluator
function evaluate(expr) {
  return eval("(" + expr + ")");
}

Pattern 3: Code Generation with Object Keys

// Serializer generating accessor code
function createGetter(path) {
  return new Function("obj", `return obj.${path}`);
}
// Exploit: path = "x; process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('id'); //"

Pattern 4: Block Comment Escape

// Code generator with "safe" comments
function generateModule(config) {
  return `
    /* Config: ${JSON.stringify(config.name)} */
    module.exports = { value: ${JSON.stringify(config.value)} };
  `;
}
// Exploit: config.name = "*/ require('child_process').execSync('id'); /*"

Pattern 5: sourceURL Injection

// Debug source mapping
const code = `${generatedCode}\n//# sourceURL=${filename}`;
new Function(code)();
// Exploit: filename contains newline + malicious code

CVSS Guidance

• Server-side code execution (Node.js): CRITICAL 9.8 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H)
• With authentication required: HIGH 8.8 (PR:L)
• Client-side only (browser): HIGH 7.5 (XSS equivalent)
• Requires specific configuration: reduce AC to H

References

• Sinks — Code execution sinks by language
• False Positive Indicators — When this isn't a real bug
• PoC Skeleton — Proof of concept template