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From clawdstrike
Conducts threat hunts on Clawdstrike events: timelines, filtered queries, pattern correlations, IOC checks, MITRE ATT&CK mapping, and incident reports.
npx claudepluginhub backbay-labs/clawdstrike --plugin clawdstrikeHow this skill is triggered — by the user, by Claude, or both
Slash command
/clawdstrike:threat-huntThe summary Claude sees in its skill listing — used to decide when to auto-load this skill
<trigger>
Guides use of SentinelOne Purple AI for natural language cybersecurity investigations, threat hunting, behavioral anomaly analysis, MITRE ATT&CK TTP mapping, and PowerQuery generation via purple_ai tool.
Autonomous threat hunting using the PEAK framework (Prepare → Execute → Act). Executes hypothesis-driven, intelligence-driven, and baseline hunts against CrowdStrike NG-SIEM. Produces hunt reports, detection backlogs, and visibility gap reports. Use when proactively hunting for threats, validating detection coverage, or responding to new threat intelligence.
Investigate a runtime threat detected by Sysdig end-to-end. Surfaces the highest-priority threat, enumerates affected images, scores vulnerability vs runtime correlations on a 1-5 confidence scale, deep-dives into network blast radius or suspicious-binary VT lookups depending on the event class, and hands the case off to Jira or PagerDuty. Triggers on: "investigate runtime threat", "what is this Falco alert", runtime incident triage, SOC investigation, Falco alert analysis.
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Follow this structured approach when investigating security events:
Call clawdstrike_timeline to get a chronological view of recent events:
Use clawdstrike_query to drill into specific criteria:
Run clawdstrike_correlate to detect patterns across events:
Use clawdstrike_ioc to check indicators against threat intelligence:
Call clawdstrike_report to produce a structured investigation summary:
Common techniques to look for in agent security events:
| Technique | ID | Indicators |
|---|---|---|
| Command and Scripting Interpreter | T1059 | Shell commands with encoded payloads, eval/exec usage |
| File and Directory Discovery | T1083 | Enumeration of sensitive directories |
| Exfiltration Over Web Service | T1567 | Egress to uncommon domains after file reads |
| Credential Access | T1552 | Access to .env, .ssh, credential files |
| Defense Evasion | T1562 | Attempts to modify security config or disable guards |
| Persistence | T1546 | Modifications to shell profiles, cron, startup files |
| Privilege Escalation | T1548 | sudo/chmod/chown commands, setuid changes |
Use this table to select the right investigation tool for each technique:
| MITRE Technique | ID | Primary MCP Tool | Investigation Approach |
|---|---|---|---|
| Command and Scripting Interpreter | T1059 | clawdstrike_query | Filter by action_type=shell, look for encoded payloads or eval/exec |
| File and Directory Discovery | T1083 | clawdstrike_timeline | Broad timeline scan for sequential file reads across sensitive dirs |
| Exfiltration Over Web Service | T1567 | clawdstrike_correlate | Correlate file reads followed by egress to uncommon domains |
| Credential Access | T1552 | clawdstrike_query | Filter by action_type=file targeting .env, .ssh, credential paths |
| Defense Evasion | T1562 | clawdstrike_query | Filter for policy modification attempts or guard config changes |
| Persistence | T1546 | clawdstrike_ioc | Check shell profile, cron, and startup file modifications |
| Privilege Escalation | T1548 | clawdstrike_query | Filter by action_type=shell for sudo, chmod, chown, setuid |
Classify incidents using these severity levels:
| Classification | Criteria | Response |
|---|---|---|
| P1 - Critical | Active exploitation, data exfiltration confirmed, credential compromise | Immediate remediation, revoke credentials, isolate affected sessions |
| P2 - High | Blocked exploit attempt, repeated policy violations, suspicious lateral movement | Investigate within current session, tighten policy, monitor for recurrence |
| P3 - Medium | Single denied action matching known TTP, anomalous but unconfirmed activity | Log for review, verify policy coverage, check for related events |
| P4 - Low | Informational anomaly, policy audit events, benign tool misuse | Document in report, no immediate action required |
When this skill is active: